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Abstract
This Senior Project advances the immigrant integration debate, examining the effect of labor
market immigrant integration policies on the European labor force. Building on an existing body
of literature that examines the migration and immigrant integration debate, this paper assesses
the relationship between immigrant integration policies in the EU and the employment rate of the
total, non-EU, low-skilled, young, old, and female labour force, by using panel data at the EU
level to answer the question, “Can the labor market integration of immigrants lead to positive
labor market outcomes as expressed by the employment rate?”. The relationship between labor
market immigrant integration policies and the employment rate, was studied both at an EU level
and at an individual country level. In order to examine the disparities that exist between the labor
market immigrant integration policies and labor market outcomes, a country analysis for Austria,
France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK was done. On the EU level, a statistically
significant positive correlation was found between the total, old, and female population and labor
market immigrant integration policies. For the non-EU, low-skilled, and young labor force
positive results were found but with no statistical significance. On the country level, the results
were also mixed. These results were not well explained by the stated hypothesis that immigrant
integration policies will lead to positive labor market outcomes as measured by the employment
rate.
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Introduction
In today’s increasingly globalized world, migration will always constitute an integral
part. Migration has been increasing all over the world and in Europe. In the European Union,
migration is a result of the increased mobility of people across member states, but also the
growing number of immigrants from outside the EU. While migration is increasing, there has
been extensive academic literature about its effect on the labour market. These academic debates
have been accompanied by political debates on whether and how many immigrants states should
allow in their territories. Most recently, the political debates have evolved around what to do
with immigrants already within states. Europe has increasingly been challenged to integrate not
only EU-nationals but also third-country nationals. A reality that has modified the understanding
of what integration initially meant. The European Union has been aiming towards a collective
response to migration and immigrant integration with respect to immigrants’ rights based on the
international human rights framework. Nevertheless, member states still perceive migration and
immigrant integration policies to be at the heart of national sovereignty.
Based on the EU framework, member states should be responsible to ensure labour
market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, permanent residency,
nationality, anti-discrimination, and health for immigrants.1,2 Employment is a core element of
the immigrant integration process and the EU has urged countries to focus on the promotion of
the labour market integration of third-country nationals. 3 These conditions will allow for
immigrants’ successful integration and thus their successful contribution to society and the

IOM, “World Migration Report 2015”, 2015.
Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015, http://www.mipex.eu/
3
European Commission, “Action Plan of the Integration of Third Country Nationals”, 2016.
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2
development of their destination countries. 4 Nevertheless, member states have been enacting
different policies and laws not necessarily following EU’s aim towards a collective EU response
to migration and immigrant integration policies. These different approaches are linked to the
academic debates around the merits of multiculturalism or assimilation.
Starting in the 1970s, European countries realized the increased prevalence of immigrants
and discussions emerged about how to deal with this consistently disadvantaged portion of the
population. The predominant response at that time was multiculturalism. However, after the turn
of the century, politicians and academics started to challenge the effectiveness of
multiculturalism. 5 , 6 Countries started implementing stricter migration policies and more
demanding immigrant integration requirements including the knowledge of the host society’s
language, history, and institutions.7 Different EU countries have been associated with different
integration “models” in relation to their approaches to immigrant integration. For example,
France8 has been the prototype of assimilationist integration policies. The Netherlands and the
UK are countries perceived as the prototypes of the multiculturalist integration approach.
However, countries’ approaches to integration have been changing. The Netherlands and the
UK9 has increasingly been disinvesting in immigrant integration policies. On the other hand,
countries like Germany 10 and Austria 11 , which had no immigrant integration policies, have

UNDP, “Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development” Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Weaver, “Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has ‘Utterly Failed,’” The Guardian, 2010.
6
Burns, “Cameron Criticizes ‘Multiculturalism’ in Britain,” The New York Times, 2011.
7
Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007.
8
Entzinger & Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration”, European Research Centre on Migration and
Ethnic Relations, 2003.
9
Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007.
10
Bendel, “Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and Local Levels”
Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014.
11
Kraler & Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?”, Migration Policy Institute, 2003.
4
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created immigrant integration policies and have increasingly invested in targeted support
programs. Importantly, the immigrant integration debate is still ongoing.
Overall, the literature around the immigration and integration of immigrants has been
extensive. In the European Union, integration policies in relation to third-country nationals
started in 1999. Since then, there has been a lot of normative developments and policy changes
that are connected to the literature around integration. There has been a lot of academic debate
about how immigrant integration works, the efficacy of certain approaches to immigrant
integration, and whether or not European integration policies are converging. However, there has
been limited quantitative analysis on the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies. On the
policy level, the European Union has commissioned some researchers in order to find the best
indicators that determine the success of immigrant integration and the factors that determine the
immigrant integration outcomes. The Migrant Integration Policy Index is the most effective tool
yet developed.
This Senior Thesis attempts to address the following question, “Can the labor market
integration of immigrants lead to positive labor market outcomes as expressed by the
employment rate?”. The operating hypothesis is that there is a positive correlation between
labour market immigrant integration and the employment rate of the total population and
different subgroups. To provide a quantitative answer to the research question, this paper uses
panel data for 17 EU countries over the time period 2007-2014. An individual country analysis
of Austria, Germany, France, Sweden, Netherlands, and the UK – countries that have been at the
center of the immigrant integration debate – will allow to further examine the disparities that
exist between labour market immigrant integration policies and outcomes.

4
Finally, this paper concludes with recommendations on how to substantiate the academic
and political debates around immigrant integration. Further questions are posed that the
European Union and its member states should examine in order to increase the importance of
immigrant integration in today’s globalized world, without which the full potential of immigrants
will never be used. Failure to enable immigrants’ potential would be a massive waste of
resources, both at the individual level and more generally for the European economy and society
as a whole.
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Chapter One: Economics of Migration
1.1 Introduction
In an increasingly globalized world, migration is unavoidably an integral part. Migration
has substantially increased all over the world and in Europe. In the European Union, increased
migration is a result of the increased mobility across Member States, but also the growing
inflows of immigrants from outside the EU. With migration being such an important part of
today’s world, it is really important that migration policies facilitate the successful contribution
of immigrants. According to UNDP’s Human Development Report, immigrant’s successful
integration is directly related to their positive contribution to society and development. 12 In order
to facilitate the successful contribution of immigrants, policies should be coordinated at the
national level while adhering to international human rights standards. EU law and developing
norms call on member states to implement migration policies that ensure labor market mobility,
family reunion, education, political participation, permanent residency, nationality, antidiscrimination, and health for immigrants.13,14 Such conditions will help immigrants to be active
participants in the development of their destination countries.
While migration is increasing, the debates around its effect on the labor market have been
extensive. Most theorists conclude on the overall positive effects of migration on the labor
market. In relation to the impact of migration on the wages and employment of native workers,
the literature has also shown that there has not been a negative impact. Recently, the literature
has developed arguing for immigrants’ positive contribution to society and development with
their successful integration. However, there has been limited economic research examining how
the integration of immigrants will specifically affect the wages and employment of native
12

UNDP, “Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development” Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
IOM, “World Migration Report 2015”, 2015.
14 Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015, http://www.mipex.eu/
13
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workers. Based on the migration literature, I support that immigrant integration will lead to
positive effects on the employment and wages of native workers.
In this chapter I will first look at the trends of migration. I will move forward to examine
Ruhs’ four economic effects of migration substantiating my stance with research on the impact
of migration showing a positive result. Then I will explore the impact of migration on the wages
and employment of native workers following the trajectory of the migration debate from 1989
until today. After showing that immigrants do not have a negative effect on the employment and
wages of native workers, I will argue that their effective integration will lead to apparent positive
results at the national level as it will complementary respond to the labour market. I will do so
connecting the migration literature to immigrant integration. Finally, I will recommend
integration as an effective policy towards the heated migration debate.

1.2 Migration Trends
It is crucial to depict the extent to which recent trends have contributed to the scope and
complexity of migration. The accurate depiction of migration trends will allow for more clarity
in relation to the principles governing international cooperation of migration and national
capacities to manage it. Most states are now simultaneously countries of origin, transit, and
destination for immigrants.15 Thus, states need to incorporate more comprehensive and inclusive
migration policies diverging from the traditional, one-dimensional policies that were once in
place.

15

OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2016”, 2016.
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According to Papademetriou16, large urban areas tend to attract the largest number of
immigrants. Given that most immigrants live in urban areas and that most population growth is
forecasted in cities and urban areas, local authorities will continue to play a crucial role in
migration governance. According to EU law and developing norms, member states and local
authorities are called to implement migration policies that will successfully integrate immigrants.
Local authorities will increasingly be responsible to ensure labor market mobility, family
reunion, education, political participation, permanent residency, nationality, anti-discrimination,
and health for immigrants.17,18 Such conditions will help in the integration of immigrants and
allow them to be active participants in the development of their destination countries.
Worldwide, the number of international migrants has grown rapidly reaching 244 million
in 2015. The number of migrants is up from 222 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. 1/3 of
all international migrants live in Europe. The stock of migrants is evenly divided between the
two genders with women accounting for 48 percent of the total.19 One third of all international
immigrants are estimated to be under the age of thirty. Also, more than 150 million are estimated
to be immigrant workers.20 Migration has a positive impact on social, cultural, and economic
benefits. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the United Nations in 2015,
recognizes the positive effects on inclusive growth and sustainable development in countries of
origin, transit and destination.21

Papademetriou, “Fostering an Inclusive Identity Where It Matters Most: At the Local Level” Migration Policy
Institute, 2014.
17 IOM, “World Migration Report 2015”, 2015.
18 MIPEX integration indicators
19 United Nations, “International Migration Report 2015: Highlights”, Department of Economic & Social Affairs,
Population Division, 2016.
20 ILO, “Global estimates of migrant workers”, 2015.
21 United Nations, “Transforming our World: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, 2015.
16
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According to Geddes and Hadj-Adbou22, in 2012, there were 34.3 million foreign citizens
living in the EU, accounting for 6.8 percent of the total European population. Of those, 13.6
million were citizens of another EU member state (2.7 percent of the total EU population), while
20.7 were third-country nationals (4.1 percent of the total EU population). The labour market
participation of immigrants that were citizens of another EU member state was higher than
nationals at 67.7 percent compared to 64.4 percent. Third-country national’s (TCN) labour
market participation was lower at 53.7 percent.

Geddes and Hadj-Adbou, “An unstable equilibrium: freedom of movement and the welfare state in the European
Union”, Handbook on Migration and Social Policy edt. By Freeman & Mirilovic, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016,
p. 227.
22

9
Figure 1.1 shows, the balance between citizens of another EU member state and TCNs in
EU member states. According to the figure, in 2013, only eight countries -Luxembourg, Ireland,
Slovakia, Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Malta- out of the 27-EU countries
had more citizens of another EU member state as their immigrant population compared to TCNs.
This figure could be viewed as evidence that non-EU immigrants are playing an increasingly
major role in the EU. However, TCNs employment rates are lower than both EU nationals &
EU-immigrants, which calls for more effective immigration policies that will ensure immigrants’
successful integration in the labor market.

1.3 Ruhs’ Four Economic Effects of Migration
According to Ruhs23, there are four economic effects of migration on the receiving states
that are most frequently discussed. First, the migration of workers whose skills and other factor
endowments are, on average, different than those from the national population can create
production complementarities increasing the national and average incomes among the resident
population of the host country. A study from 1980-2005 in the OECD counties found that
immigrants were complements rather than substitutes to the native workforce. 24,25 Generally,
migration has little effect on the wages and employment of native workers. 26 It might suppress
wages and employment opportunities for low-skilled native-born workers and earlier
immigrants, in the short-run, if new immigrants become substitutes for similarly low-skilled
workers. However, the evidence suggests that the impact is small and, on average, essentially
Ruhs, “Theorizing labor immigration policies: openness, skills and rights”, Handbook on Migration and Social
Policy edt. By Freeman & Mirilovic, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, p.442.
24 Ortega and Peri, “The causes and effects of international labor mobility: evidence from OECD countries 19802005”, United Nations Development Programme Human Development Research, 2009.
25 Foged and Peri, “Immigrants’ effect on native workers: new analysis on longitudinal data”, Institute for the Study
of Labour, 2015.
26 Peri, “Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers?”, IZA World of Labor, 2014.
23
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zero.27 Importantly, immigrants’ successful integration will unlikely have such effects as it will
allow for their successful skill use and will complementary respond to labor market demands.
Second, immigrant workers can play a role in responding to labor and skill shortages in
specific sectors and/or occupations. According to the World Bank, migration brings immediate
increases in the labour supply facilitating many countries’ shortages at both the high and low
ends of the skill spectrum.28 It is expected that, without immigration, the EU population will
decline by 57 million people by the year of 2050.29 This expectation is created by increasing life
expectancy in combination with low birth rates in Europe. However, the population of North
Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia –Europe’s neighboring countries – is characterized by
the increasing number of young individuals.30 Currently, it is estimated that the proportion of
TCNs living in Europe is 4.1 percent of the total population. 31 According to a report by the
United Nations, European economies will need 700 million immigrants for the next 50 years to
sustain growth and support their social security systems.32 Thus, migration could be the remedy
of the aging European population with young individuals entering the EU from neighboring
countries.
Third, migration could generate spillover effects resulting from a bigger economy (higher
GDP), a more diverse society, a great share of highly skilled and motivated individuals, and a
higher population density among others. Interestingly, spillover effects could be both positive
and negative. Positively, most immigrants are relative young thus are actively participating in the

Peri, “Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers?”, IZA World of Labor, 2014, p.1.
World Bank “Migration and Development: A Role for the World Bank Group”, 2016.
29 United Nations, “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?” Population
Division, Economic and Social Affairs, 2000.
30
Munz, “Old Europe: A Look Ahead to the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Human Sciences, 2007.
31 OECD, “Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015”, 2015.
32 United Nations, “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?”, Population
Division, Economic and Social Affairs, 2000.
27
28

11
workforce contributing to the gross domestic product (GDP).33 Increasing domestic demand for
goods and services, immigrants also create jobs. Between 2000 and 2007, immigrants in the
United States contributed to 32 per cent of GDP growth.34Immigrants also actively contribute in
the creation of new jobs through their entrepreneurial spirit. From 1998 to 2008, foreign-born,
self-employed owners of small and medium-sized firms created on average 1.4 to 2.1 additional
jobs. 35 Additionally, immigrants play a great role in innovation especially in the fields of
technology, engineering, and mathematics. Since 1975, 91 per cent of the patents in the United
States were registered by inventors of Chinese, Indian, and European decent.36 Immigrants play a
key role in the most dynamic sectors of the economy. New immigrants represent 22% of entries
into expanding occupation in the US while 15% in the EU.37 Overall, recent evidence shows that
immigrants are likely to boost firm productivity and the wages of native workers, in the long-run,
stimulating firm growth and contributing to a range of skills and ideas.38
Forth, immigrants could be a burden or a boost for the welfare state and public finances
depending on the difference between the taxes they pay and the costs of public services and
benefits they consume. According to the “International Migration Outlook 2013” of the OECD,
international immigrants contribute more on direct and indirect taxes than they receive on social
benefits.39

OECD, ILO, World Bank. “The Contributions of Labor Mobility to Economic Growth.” Joint paper for G20
Labour and Employment Ministers’ Meeting, 2015.
34
Puente et al., “Towards an assessment of migration, development and human rights links: conceptual framework
and new strategic indicators”, Peoples’ Global Action on Migration, Development, and Human Rights, IV Global
Forum, 2010.
35
OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2011”, 2011.
36
Kerr, “U.S. high-skilled immigration, innovation, and entrepreneurship: empirical approaches and evidence”,
World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013.
37
OECD, ILO, World Bank. “The Contributions of Labor Mobility to Economic Growth.” Joint paper for G20
Labour and Employment Ministers’ Meeting, 2015.
38
Peri, “Do immigrants depress the wages of native workers?”, IZA World of Labor, 2014, p.1.
39
OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2013”, 2013.
33
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All of the aforementioned evidence, responding to Ruhs’ four economic effects of
migration on the receiving countries, suggests that immigrants are unlikely to hurt the host
country and more importantly they benefit it. Increasingly though, the migration debate is fueled
by biased data and inaccurate information stressing the challenges of migration, while
downplaying the positive effects especially in the long term. This negative stereotyping creates
xenophobic and racist sentiments. According to the European Barometer Survey of Spring
2015 40 , more than half of the European population had a negative feeling towards the
immigration of people from outside the European Union. A large number of natives feel
threatened by immigrants and hold negative attitudes towards them and migration. 41 These
hostile attitudes are also depicted through the rise of extremist parties in numerous European
countries. 42 Also, studies in some European countries show that migrant job candidates face
increasing discrimination in their access to employment.43
The words “migrant” and “refugee” are irregularly distinguished and many times
conflated in political discourse. 44 Refugees are established by international conventions as
involuntary displaced individuals by political circumstances, whereas immigrants are seen as
individuals voluntarily leaving their countries for better economic opportunities. Such views
many times lead to perceive immigrants as unworthy of social, economic and political rights as
they are perceived to have made a choice. Nevertheless, such distinctions do not always
accurately reflect the causes of immigration. Many times, individuals are pushed to leave their

40

European Standard Eurobarometer Survey 83, 2015, p.36.
Billiet, Meuleman, & Witte, “The Relationship Between Ethnic Threat and Economic Insecurity in Times of
Economic Crisis: Analysis of European Social Survey Data”, Migration Studies, 2014.
42
Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, “The Rise of The Far Right in Debtor and Creditor European Countries: The Case of
European Parliament Elections”, The Political Quarterly, 2015.
43
Simeone, Taran & Gächter, “‘Situation-Testing’: Discrimination in Access to Employment based on ILO
Methodology”, International Migration Programme, 2010, p. 4.
44
Holmes & Castaneda, “Representing “the European refugee crisis” in Germany and beyond: Deservingness and
difference, life and death” Journal of the American Ethnological Society, 2016.
41
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countries by economic circumstances that are politically produced; “Voluntary” economic
immigrants leave their countries due to structural violence and post-colonial economic
inequalities.45,46
In an increasingly globalized world, where migration is an integral part, it is important to
accurately reflect the migration impact and its positive effects. Migration mostly results from the
demand and supply conditions in the labor markets of both the origin and the destination
countries. Immigrants fill labour and skill gaps 47 , transfer remittances, contribute to social
protection systems, taxes, innovation and entrepreneurship, promote trade and investment and
transfer technology, skills and knowledge. In relation to economic development, immigrants’
greatest contribution comes when they are well integrated, and their skills are properly used
according to the host country’s needs.
In order to facilitate the successful contribution of immigrants, policies should be
coordinated at the national level and should be based on international human rights standards. A
lack of the protection of immigrants’ rights could lead to their exclusion and exploitation.
Importantly, the protection of immigrants could benefit national workers by preventing a race to
the bottom in relation to immigrants’ pay and working conditions. As Ruhs48 rightly explains,
differential rights between immigrants and the native population could have negative effects.
This stems from the fact that some employment-related rights can be costly for employers. All
else being equal, employers will prefer immigrant workers under restricted rights than resident
workers with full employment rights. The differential of the wage and employment conditions
Holmes & Seth “Structural Vulnerability and Hierarchies of Ethnicity and Citizenship on the Farm” Medical
Anthropology, 2011.
46
Holmes & Seth “Fresh Fruit, Broken Bodies: Migrant Farmworkers in the United States” Berkley: University
California Press, 2013.
47
OECD, ILO, World Bank. “The Contributions of Labor Mobility to Economic Growth.” Joint paper for G20
Labour and Employment Ministers’ Meeting, 2015.
48
Ruhs, “Theorizing labor immigration policies: openness, skills and rights”, Handbook on Migration and Social
Policy edt. By Freeman & Mirilovic, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, p.452
45
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between natives and nationals could lead to a complete segmentation of the labour market.
Consequently, equality in pay and work-related rights vis-à-vis labour market immigrant
integration could help avoid such negative consequences.
Overall, migration and development-related policies should be based on accurate
information in contrast to misconceptions portraying immigrants as job-stealers or burdens. As,
in fact, international migration contributes both directly and indirectly to the economic growth of
host countries. Crucially though, the benefits of migration largely depend on the respect and
upholding of immigrants’ rights based on the international human rights framework. In the
European framework, the migration ‘governance’ model, although sometimes prevented by
national interests, emphasizes its support for the migration of TCNs as labor needed for the
economic development of the European Union.49 Additionally, the integration of immigrants is
seen as an important step towards their inclusion to society. Consequently, the EU has aimed at
the development of a common EU framework on the integration of TCNs as part of the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice. The integration of third-country nationals has been incorporated
in migration management aiming to secure access to rights, security, and social inclusion in
third-country nationals. Labor market immigrant integration is given increasing importance in
EU decisions seen as a “key part of the integration process” 50 making immigrants’ contributions
to society visible.
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1.4 Migration Literature
In this section, I would like to explore the impact of migration on the wages and
employment of native workers. In order to do so, I will follow the trajectory of the migration
debate on their impact to the native population from 1989 until today. I will analyze the
perspectives of George Borjas, David Card, Giovanni Peri et al., Michael Clemens and Jennifer
Hunt, and David Roodman.

My aim is to challenge Borjas’ perceptive that immigrants

negatively affect the wages and employment of native workers supporting my claims with
evidence provided by Card, Peri et al., Clemens & Hunt, and Roodman.
In 1989, Borjas developed a theory for international migration based on the neoclassical
model of demand and supply. As he stated economics studies the allocation of scarce resources
and “labor is a scarce resource that may be “allocated” to different labor markets.” 51 People will
migrate to maximize their utility (income-maximization hypothesis) and thus people will be
“traded” across boundaries in the “immigration market” similarly with goods traded across
boundaries in the international goods market.52 Individuals’ decisions to migrate will depend on
the individuals’ financial resources, the immigration regulations imposed by competing host
countries and the emigration regulations of the source country.53 According to Borjas’ theory,
individuals with higher earning capacities will find it more expensive to migrate.54

Borjas, “Economic Theory and International Migration”, The International Migration Review, Vol. 23, 1989.
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53 Ibid, p.461.
54 Ibid, p.464.
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On the effect on wages, Borjas stated that immigrant wages will decrease based on the
principle of diminishing marginal productivity. As more immigrants enter the labor market, their
supply will increase, and their marginal productivity will decline lowering their wages. In
relation to natives, if natives and immigrants are substitutes (Graph 1), the equilibrium wage
(WW’) and employment (QQ’) of natives will decline as their labor demand will fall (point
C). Thus, if natives and immigrants are substitutes, competition between them will lead to
negative results in the labour market. On the other hand, if natives and immigrants are
complements (Graph 2), natives will benefit from the entry of immigrants in the labor market
increasing both their wages (WW’) and employment (QQ’). Natives and immigrants will
complement each other increasing the overall labor demand (LdLd’). Empirical evidence at
that time, suggested that immigrants’ effect on natives’ wages was negative but minimal. On the
other hand, immigrants’ effect on immigrant wages was significant.55
In 1990, Card56 tested Borjas’ theory by looking at the large inflow of Cuban immigrants
in the Miami labor market that happened in 1980. According to the data available, 50% of the
Mariel immigrants settled permanently in Miami.57 This specific event was a perfect instance to
examine the effect that low-skilled immigrants have on the wages and employment of native
workers. It was an ideal “natural experiment”; a large, sudden wave of immigrants entering the
Miami labor market, which allowed to test the economic theory in practice.
Card found that immigrants increased the Miami labor force by 7% and importantly
increased the labor supply of low-skilled workers even more because most of the immigrants
were relatively unskilled. However, the inflow of Mariel immigrants had no effect on the wages

Borjas, “Economic Theory and International Migration”, The International Migration Review, Vol. 23, 1989.
Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
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and unemployment rates of low-skilled workers. Mariel immigrants effected the wages of neither
non-Cuban workers nor other Cubans. Interestingly, the data suggests that a remarkably rapid
absorption of the Mariel immigrants into the Miami labor force happened.58
According to Card this happened for two reasons. First, individuals respond to expected
labor market opportunities thus they migrate to labour markets that could absorb them.
Specifically, Cuban immigrants migrated to Miami because the structure of Miami’s industry
was able to absorb them as it was in need of low-skilled labor. Miami’s high concentration of
textile and apparel industries allowed Mariel immigrants to take unskilled jobs that earlier Cuban
immigrants did not want anymore. Also, the high concentration of Hispanics in Miami, allowed
non-English speaking Mariel immigrants to be easily absorbed in the labour market as the role of
language played a smaller effect. At the same time, native workers affected by the inflow of
immigrants could have migrated to places where there was an increasing labor demand offsetting
the negative effects of migration. Like Mariel immigrants migrated to Miami, other individuals
could have migrated elsewhere leading to an overall positive labor market equilibrium. In a
nutshell, Card suggests that the labour market is dynamic responding to changes and not static as
Borjas and the neoclassical model is implying.
In 2003, Borjas 59 revisited the impact of immigration on the labour market. Borjas
agreed with Samuelson’s assertion that in the textbook-model of a competitive labour market, an
immigrant influx will lead to lower wages for competing factors. 60 Borjas criticized the
geographic-dispersion-approach arguing that “the local labour market can adjust in far too many
ways to provide a reasonable analogue to the “closed market” economy that underlies the
Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
Vol. 43, No.2, 1990, p.256.
59 Borjas, “The Labour Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the
Labour Market”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003.
60 Ibid, p.1335.
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textbook supply-and-demand framework.” 61 He also criticized the factor-proportions-approach
arguing that it is too general, and it does not examine how certain shocks disproportionately
affect some workers in relation to others. Overall, Borjas supported that studies like the Mariel
Boatlift imply that the more firms and workers adjust to the immigrant supply shock, the smaller
the cross-region correlations will be – disregarding migrants’ actual effect on native workers.62
In this paper, Borjas assumed that both schooling and work experience play a role in
defining a skill group.63 Thus, he assumed that similarly educated workers with different levels
of experience are not perfect substitutes. Taking both variables into consideration, he found that
immigration had an importantly negative impact on the labour market opportunities of native
workers. Borjas looked at men between the ages of 16-64 and found that between 1980 and
2000, the labour supply of working men increased by 11.0 percent, while the wage of native
workers decreased by 3.2 percent. Importantly, he found that the wage impact was
disproportionate with high school dropouts being the most affected with an 8.9 percent decrease.
It is interesting how Borjas mentioned in his conclusion that he ignored the potential
benefits that immigrants will have in the host country. As he stated64,
[the] analysis ignored the long-run capital adjustments induced by immigration, the role played by capital-skill
complementarities, and the possibility that high-skill immigration is an important engine for endogenous
technological change

Thus, Borjas acknowledged that he is focused only on the short-run, negative (based on his
findings) effects of low-skilled migration.

Borjas, “The Labour Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the
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In 2009, Peri and Sparber65 came to support the evidence provided by Card in 1990 with
the development of a model focusing on specialization. Their evidence came in contrast with
Borjas’ findings. As they argue if workers’ skills are differentiated only by educational
attainment/skill level, and the production technology and productivity of each type of labor are
given, then a large inflow of low-skilled migrants could be shown to have a negative effect on
the wages of native workers. This comes in alignment with Borjas findings. However, it can be
the case that workers with similar observable characteristics are imperfect substitutes.66 Migrants
and natives with comparable educational attainment and experience tend to have different unique
skills. According to Peri and Sparber, workers will eventually specialize on what is best for their
abilities eliminating the effect on wages since immigrants and natives will become
complements.
Large inflows of less-educated immigrants may reduce wages paid to comparably-educated, native-born workers,
However, if less educated foreign- and native-born workers specialize in different production tasks, because of
different abilities, immigration will cause natives to reallocate their task supply, thereby reducing downward wage
pressure.67

Empirical research at that time suggested that immigrant workers tend to specialize in
manual labor tasks as they have imperfect language skills and physical skills similar to nativeborn workers. Immigrants have a comparative advantage in manual labor tasks, and consequently
natives will have a comparative advantage in jobs demanding higher communication skills. This
will lead workers to specialize accordingly and become complements. The market will benefit
from specialization as productivity will increase. Importantly, language-intensive jobs tend to

Peri & Sparber, “Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages”, American Economic Journal: Applied
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earn a comparatively higher wage in relation to manually intensive jobs. Also, the wage could be
further increased by the increased aggregate supply of complementary manually intensive jobs.
Productivity gains from specialization in addition to higher wages paid to communication skills
will offset the adverse effect on the wages paid to native workers. Indeed, according to Peri &
Sparber 68 , migration reduced average real wages of less-educated US-born workers by 0.3
percent between 1990 and 2000. Without task specialization the impact would have been bigger
at 1.2 percent.
In 2015, Borjas69 reassessed Card’s original data and supported that Card chose wrong
comparisons leading to positive results. As he emphasized, the effect of migration on the wage
structure largely depends on the difference between the skills of immigrants and natives.70 Borjas
supported that at least 60 percent of the Mariel immigrants were high school dropouts while the
group made over a quarter of the city’s workforce. Thus, Borjas replicated the results by looking
at what happened to the pre-existing group of high school dropouts in Miami. In order to do so,
he looked at the wage trends of non-Hispanic men; 55.1% of the non-Hispanic dropouts in
Miami were black. According to this evidence, the key native-born population potentially
affected by the Marielitos was the low-skilled African American workers. Borjas found that the
wages of high school dropouts between 1977-1979 and 1981-1986 fell dramatically (10-30%)
which was a very unusual event compared to the wage trends of other cities at that period of
time. He also supported that Card’s “placebo” group was wrong leading to a weaker measured
impact of migration. Overall, Borjas’ paper emphasized on the evolution of measurements and
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argued that reexamining old data with new ideas could reveal different trends that could alter our
way of thinking.
The debate evolved when, in 2016, Peri and Yasenov71, replicated Card’s original data
using different methods in comparison to Borjas. Peri and Yasenov also looked at high school
dropouts but did not find any negative effects. They argued that Borjas used a really small
sample which resulted in noise and measurement errors. Additionally, there were two important
events at that period, which could have affected the wages and employment opportunities in the
labor market. First, there was an increase in the minimum wage in 1981 and secondly, there was
a recession in 1982; consequently, an accurate control is of outmost importance. Peri and
Yasenov first replicated the results with a larger sample and also used new mechanisms that
allowed for immigrant complementarity, technology, and efficiency adjustments going beyond
the one-dimensional neoclassical model that Borjas consistently uses. Using evolved methods in
comparison to the study by Card in 1990, Peri and Yasenov found no evidence of negative wage
and employment effects. They rather found that the deviation of low-skilled wages in Miami post
1979 was small, non-significant and positive.
Finally, in 2017 Clemens and Hunt72, brought additional support to Peri and Yasenov’s
claim that the selection of narrow subgroups can lead to different results. They also stressed that
specification choices in the use of instrumental variables can impact the results. They argued that
Borjas’ small sample of non-Hispanic workers was affected by a large, simultaneous, and
irrelevant increase of the share of blacks in the original survey data. Black Miamians at that time
had considerably low wages negatively affecting the results. Clemens and Hunt substantiated
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their evidence further by looking at refugee waves showing that the impact of immigration on
average native-born workers is small, while the impact on low-skilled workers is not detrimental.
Overall, they agreed with Borjas that the “reanalysis of prior results often advances social
science”, but in doing so, they led to strikingly different conclusions.

1.4.1 Current Debate
In this section, I will emphasize on the last findings that exist and more specifically on
Clemens and Hunt’s (2017) paper in contrast to Borjas’ (2015) results. In his article, 73 Roodman
supports that Borjas’ results are weak evidence on immigrants’ negative effect on the wages and
employment of natives, especially of the low-skilled workers. As Clements and Hunt highlight,
the arrival of the Marielitos came at the same time as the Census Bureau increased its coverage
of the black Miamians. Black Miamians had especially low wages, which was highlighted in
Borjas study. I agree with Roodman’s position and will support my argument below.
First, Roodman looks at the wages of low-education workers in 1980 and finds that their
wages do not seem to have fallen since the drop is not sudden or big. He emphasizes that one can
interpret the results differently in relation to their prior and argues that Borjas finds such results
since he is preoccupied to find negative effects of immigrants on natives in the labor market.
“The Borjas data are compatible with the hypothesis that wages fell at a constant rate between
1977 and 1986, with no break from trend in 1980 or any other year in that span.” Since no
sudden drop is seen in 1980, the year that Mariel Boatlift immigrants entered the Miamian labor
market, one cannot argue that Mariel boatlift immigrants were the ones that caused the fall in the
wages of native workers.
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Secondly, Roodman argues that, as Clemens and Hunt highlighted, Borjas’ negative
results stem from the fact that the Census Bureau incorporated the wages of more low-income
blacks. The Census Bureau provides weights that can compensate for such changes, but as
Clemens and Hunt showed, these weights do not correct for the under-coverage of black
Miamians before 1980. Thus, Borjas’ negative long-term effects in wages is caused from the
coverage of low-income blacks in both data sets further weakening Borjas’ evidence of a
negative long-term impact.
Roodman re-emphasizes that Borjas’ sample size is really small. As Clemens explained
in another article,74 Borjas left out 91 per cent of the low-skilled workers in Miami leaving him
with a tiny sample of just 17 workers per year. Last but not least, Roodman states that it is really
valuable that researchers, like Borjas, are increasingly more transparent making their data and
computer code available, as it allows for greater debate on issues such as the one I am examining
on this chapter.
Overall, a long literature in labor economics has come to a consensus that immigrants’
effect on native workers’ wages and employment is small or zero. On the same line, as I have
already stated, I support that immigrants do not have a negative effect on the wages and
employment of native workers supporting my claims with evidence provided by Card, Peri et al.,
Yasenov, Clemens, Hunt, and Roodman. I perceive Borjas’ claims to be preoccupied and have
supported my beliefs with evidence from various economists.
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1.5 Migration Literature Applied to Immigrant Integration
Borjas (1989) 75 has stressed that migration might suppress wages and employment
opportunities for low-skilled native-born workers and earlier immigrants if new immigrants
become substitutes for similarly low-skilled workers. However, economic research has shown
that migration has zero or positive effects on the wages and employment of native workers.
Immigrant integration will boost these positive effects on the labor market as it will allow for the
successful specialization of immigrants and will thus complementary respond to labor market
demands. Specifically, economic integration aims to “develop a skilled workforce responding to
labor market needs, promoting job quality and lifelong learning” 76 . Immigrants’ greatest
contribution comes when they are well integrated, and their skills are properly used according to
the host country’s needs.
According to Card (1990) 77 , immigrants will optimally choose destination countries
where their skills are more highly demanded, and the labor market can absorb them effectively.
Thus, in the EU, immigrants will migrate to countries where their skill-set is more highly
demanded expecting to be employed at jobs where their skills match. However, in the EU
immigrants face a high over-qualification rate and thus a skill-job mismatch 78. The number of
highly-educated migrants has increased rapidly in the past decade, but much of migrants’
potential is currently not used. In 2010/11, 10 million highly educated migrants were not
employed in the OECD and a further 8 million were formally overqualified for their job 79. Part
of the economic integration policies in the EU is to ensure that there is successful match between
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the skills of immigrants and their job.80 This will lead to immigrants positively responding to the
needs of the economy and complementary responding to the labor market.
Going back to the graph of the labour market,
labour market immigrant integration will
match the skills of immigrants with the needs
of the economy resulting to migrants and
natives being complements in the economy
and thus higher wages (W  W’) and
employment (Q  Q’). It is expected that the
successful integration of migrants will lead to both short-run and long-run positive effects in the
labor market as expressed in the wages and employment of native workers as its aim is to
facilitate the positive effects of migration.
According to Peri & Sparber (2009) 81 , immigrants and natives with comparable
educational attainment and experience tend to have unique skills making them imperfect
substitutes. This will lead them to specialize on tasks that are best for their abilities eliminating
the effect on wages since immigrants and natives will become complements. Peri and Sparber’s
argument was based on empirical research at that time, which suggested that immigrants tend to
specialize in manual labor tasks as they have imperfect language skills and physical skills similar
to native-born workers. D’Amuri and Peri (2010) 82 analyzed the effect on immigration on
natives’ job specialization in Western Europe and found that immigrants and natives tend to
specialize in different production tasks. Specifically, the average native worker increasingly
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specializes in more complex production tasks, while the average immigrant worker is
increasingly specializing in more routine, manual jobs. However, immigrant workers’
specialization in more routine, manual jobs could also be seen as a result of the difficulties in
transferring skills across borders.83
In recent years, foreign-born workers are increasingly concentrated in the service sector.
Immigrants tend to be over-represented in the hotel and food services, in administrative and
support service activities and in jobs where the employer is the household.84 These changes are
happening as Europe as a whole is transforming from being a production economy to a service
economy. We can see in the graph that the percentage change of the employment in the service
sector from 2007 – 2014, has been increasing. In 2014, 71.05% of the total EU labor force was
employed in the service sector.
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Additionally, the recent economic crisis affected the manufacturing, construction, and
financial sector further reducing the share of such jobs provided in the labor market as a whole.85
In the manufacturing sector, immigrants are under-represented in relation to natives in the
majority of the EU countries. Based on OECD data86, the immigrant share of employment in the
manufacturing sector declined in relative terms between 2000 and 2005-2006 in all OECD
countries, while an increasing proportion of immigrants are employed in the service sector.
Based on the empirical research provided by Peri and Sparber one could argue that
language acquisition through integration could lead to natives and immigrants becoming
substitutes in the economy negatively affecting the wages and employment of native workers.
Empirical research at that time suggested that immigrants tend to specialize in manual labor tasks
as they have imperfect language skills and physical skills similar to native-born workers.
However, based on current empirical evidence in Europe, language acquisition could be seen as
an integral part for immigrants’ successful specialization to the service sector. Speaking the
native language or other languages could help immigrants being more successful in the service
sector. Having said that, language acquisition through the integration of migrants should not be
seen a threat to the native workforce in the EU.
Also, language acquisition and labour market integration could lead to greater autonomy
of migrants allowing them to participate in the labour market without the need of social
networks. This effect could be expanded with integration policies as a whole where learning the
culture and norms could lead to effective, independent participation in mainstream institutions.
This way, market adjustment to migration would be faster and efficiency will be increased.
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The successful labour market integration of migrants will lead to equality in pay and
work-related rights not allowing employers to choose immigrants instead of natives because they
can pay them an inferior wage. A lack of the protection of immigrants’ rights could lead to their
exclusion and exploitation. Importantly, the protection of immigrants could benefit national
workers by preventing a race to the bottom in relation to immigrants’ pay and working
conditions. This will thus not result in negative labour market consequences for natives.
Overall, immigrants contribute to the host countries’ economies complementary
responding to labour market needs. However, the full potential of immigrants’ skills is not
always efficiently used because of the ineffective transferability of skills. This could be caused
because there is non-equivalence and/or non-recognition of qualifications, lack of language
skills, or restricted access to specific occupations. 87 Effectively using the full potential of
immigrants’ skills is an important challenge for the EU especially at a time when the EU is
experiencing an increasingly ageing population and a growing demand for skills as their
economies become more knowledge-based. 88 Migration can only continue to have a positive
impact in the economy and the labor market if immigrants are well-integrated and their skills are
properly used.
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1.6 Recommended Policy: Immigrant Integration
In an increasingly globalized world, where migration is an integral part, it is important to
accurately reflect the migration impact and its positive effects. Importantly, immigrants’ positive
contribution to society and development is directly related to their successful integration.89 Based
on the international human rights framework, immigrants’ integration is part of their human
rights. In the EU, law and developing norms call on member states to implement migration
policies that will successfully integrate migrants into society. National authorities are called to be
responsible to ensure labor market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation,
permanent residency, nationality, anti-discrimination, and health for immigrants. 90 , 91 Such
conditions will help immigrants to be active participants in the development of their destination
countries and positively contribute to the economy.
Importantly though, migration ‘governance’ meaning the collection of national laws,
policies, and practices, supported by an emerging international framework –both binding and
non-binding– could vary across states. This is the case with the integration of immigrants where
states regulate their own economic, social and cultural interests integrating immigrants
analogously. Nevertheless, the conditions of the integration of immigrants should always be
defined by the international human rights framework, including the protection of their economic,
social and cultural rights.92 Migration can have a strong positive impact on the state’s economic,
social and cultural development when immigrants are well-integrated accordingly.
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One should point out that an important challenge for migration governance is the
existence of tension between the increasing international attention to migration and the growing
national anti-migrant, xenophobic sentiments. This tension calls for the effective migration
governance and international cooperation in order to alleviate the increasing hostility at the
national level. After showing that immigrants do not have a negative effect on the employment
and wages of native workers, I have argued that their effective integration will lead to apparent
positive results at the national level and it will hopefully alleviate such tensions.
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Chapter Two: European Immigrant Integration
2.1 Introduction
Since the establishment of the European Union, integration has been at the core of EU
policies. The European integration process in the EU started with the establishment of an internal
market. 93 At that time, integration aimed to facilitate the mobility of EU-national migrant
workers across the internal borders of member states, where they would enjoy equality, nondiscrimination, family reunification and secure judicial status. 94 In the 1990s, 95 the focus of
integration shifted from EU-nationals to TCNs and since then the EU has aimed at the
development of a common EU framework on the integration of TCNs as part of the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice.
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Integration has now been incorporated in migration

management aiming to secure access to rights, security, and social inclusion to third-country
nationals.97 As stated in the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the
European Union (CBP), which was one of the first & most important steps towards a common
EU framework, immigrant integration is seen as a “dynamic, two-way process of mutual
accommodation by all migrants & residents of member states”98. Thus, immigrant integration is
seen as an active process that is facilitated by both immigrants and Member States. Overall, in
today’s globalized world where people are moving around the world at an increasing rate,
Europe has increasingly been challenged to integrate not only EU-nationals but also thirdcountry nationals; a reality that has modified the initial understanding of what integration meant
to include.
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Globalization has increasingly altered the position and institutional features of the nationstate. The model of post-national citizenship, as exemplified in the European Union, has been a
response to the challenges of globalization. The model insists on the importance of the nationstate and its sovereignty while at the same time it advocates for a form of membership that
transcends the boundaries of the nation-state99. As Soysal argues100, rights and obligations are no
longer defined based on nationality but on universal personhood. Immigrant integration is caught
in this intersection, where the integration of migrants is seen as an integral part of their human
rights, but member states still perceive migration and immigrant integration policies to be at the
heart of national sovereignty.
Even if the EU has been aiming towards a collective response to migration and immigrant
integration with respect to migrants’ human rights, member states still perceive migration and
immigrant integration policies to be at the heart of national sovereignty. The European approach
has been to encourage what is typically referred to as a ‘process of convergence’ among states
with regards to immigrant integration. Thus, the European Union in its ‘process of convergence’
has been increasingly using non-legislative policy-making and soft-law governance
techniques101. European immigrant integration is primarily based on “knowledge-sharing, policy
coordination and the exchange of information.”102 Since 2004, the EU has taken important steps
towards immigrant integration. A set of Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration
Policy (CBPs)103, three Handbooks on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners104, three
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Annual Report(s) on Migration and Integration105, the National Contact Points on Integration106,
a European Web Site on Integration focusing on immigrant integration 107 , as well as the
European Fund for Integration of third-country nationals (EIF)108 are among the steps that the
EU has taken towards a collective response to immigrant integration.
The most positive step towards a collective response to the integration of TCNs was
taken in 2016, with the Action Plan 109 . Stressing the increasing levels of discrimination,
prejudice, racism and xenophobia in the last few years, the European Commission stated that it is
Europe’s legal, moral and economic imperatives to uphold fundamental rights, values and
freedoms. The European Commission concluded that the integration of immigrants is a common
interest to all Member States and investing to immigrant integration policies will lead to positive
long-run effects. The Action Plan highlighted that employment is a core element of the
immigrant integration process and urged countries to focus their efforts on the promotion of
labour market integration of third-country nationals. Importantly, it was not the first time that
employment’s importance was emphasized. In the First Annual Report on Migration and
Integration110, published in 2004, “access to employment” became “the most important political
priority within national integration policies”. It also appeared in the Common Basic Principles,
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the same year, as a “key part of the integration process”111 making immigrants’ contributions to
society visible (CBP3).
However, the official EU stance on the direction of immigrant integration policies as a
whole remains rather ambivalent. The CBPs, the “principles against which [Member States] can
judge and assess their own [integration] efforts” allow room for a wide range of interpretation.
This is a reflection of the complicated national histories of responding to minorities and new
immigrants in different European states. Countries have a wide range of policies and underlying
theories, but one of the principal areas of uncertainty has been how to address the questions of
cultural diversity.
Starting in the 1970s, several European countries realized the increased prevalence of
immigrants and discussions emerged about how to deal with this consistently disadvantaged
portion of the population. In Europe, the predominant response around that time was
multiculturalism. However, after the turn of the century, politicians and academics started to
challenge the effectiveness of multiculturalism. 112 , 113 Countries started implementing stricter
migration policies and more demanding immigrant integration requirements including the
knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions (CBP4)114. On the other hand,
some countries started taking more encouraging steps towards immigrant integration. Countries,
like Germany and Austria, that had no immigrant integration policies before created immigrant
integration policies and acknowledged their status as an immigration country. 115 Nevertheless,
this does not mean that the debate around immigrant integration is yet resolved.
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Overall, the literature around the immigration and integration of migrants has been
extensive. Integration policies in relation to third-country nationals in the European Union
started in 1999 116 . Since then, there have been a lot of normative developments and policy
changes that are connected to the literature around integration. There has been a lot of academic
debate about how immigrant integration works, the efficacy of certain approaches to immigrant
integration, and whether or not European integration policies for migrants are converging. On the
policy level, the European Union has commissioned some researchers in order to find the best
indicators that determine the success of immigrant integration and the factors that determine the
immigrant integration outcomes. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)117 is the most
effective tool that has been developed. It analyzes immigrant integration in eight policy areas labour market mobility, education of children, political participation, family reunion, access to
nationality, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination –based on the highest European
and international standards drawn from the Council of European Conventions, European Union
Directives and international conventions.

2.2. Academic Theories on Immigrant Integration
It is common to associate the idea of immigrant integration with that of a “model”
categorizing each country according to a specific “pattern” when dealing with migration.
Importantly, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity could be treated differently according to
different political systems. Michael Walzer offers a classification of the political systems
according to their approach to diversity. He defines five “political tolerance systems” in the
West: multinational empires, international society, consociations, nation-states and immigration
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societies.118 According to Walzer, these systems differ by their specific management of cultural,
linguistic, and religious diversity laying the foundation of a certain mode of cohabitation.
Categorizing the countries of the European Union based on Walzer’s classification system, we
would argue that ‘nation-states’ is the prevailing model.
The nation-state means that “a single dominant group organizes life together according to
its own history and culture.”119 In the European Union, each country has its own dominant ethnic
group -majority- sharing a common history and culture. The State recognizes and accepts the
existence of minorities in its territory, but its tolerance is limited not challenging the cultural and
linguistic monopoly granted to the majority. This collective approach is directly related to
integration. In nation-states, integration does not only involve migrants; it involves the entire
population. According to Marcel Mauss, “there cannot be a nation without there being a certain
integration of society” 120 , since by definition the nation is “a society materially and morally
integrated, with a stable and permanent central authority, with determinate borders, whose
inhabitants possess a relative moral, mental, and cultural unity and consciously adhere to the
state and its laws”121 Thus, immigrant integration is inseparable from national integration as a
whole explaining the link that is established between national identity and migration. Immigrants
have to become integrated as it is expected from nationals serving to the definition both of the
nation by Mauss and the nation-state by Walzer.
Mauss argues that integration is a consequence of ‘individualization’ writing that “a
nation worthy of its name has its own civilization (aesthetic, moral, material) and almost always
its own language. It has its own mentality, its own sensibility, its own morality, its own will, its
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own form of progress”122. Thus, ‘individualization’, as Brubaker123 rightly says in his analysis of
Mauss’ theory, has a dual aspect. First, internal homogenization vis a vis integration, and
secondly, external differentiation. Mauss further argues that migration accentuates this desire of
the nation to maintain its individuality. 124 However, as he later observes what we today call
globalization has resulted in a “state of permeation and growing mutual dependency”125 leading
to “mentalities of nations… more open than ever before to each other”.126 As Brubaker addresses
this could lead to integration on a super-national scale and consequently to the deindividualization of the nation.127
Globalization has increasingly altered the position and institutional features of the state.
Globalization forces have destabilized the role of the state and more specifically that of the
nation-state. The model of post-national citizenship comes as a response to the destabilization of
national citizenship. One could argue that the model of post-national citizenship is exemplified in
the European Union. Quoting Benhabib, “The European Union reproduces at the supranational
level the internal tensions which have accompanied the birth of modern nation-states, while also
showing their evolution along a different path.”128 The model insists on the importance of the
nation-state and its sovereignty while at the same time it advocates for a form of membership
that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state129. As Soysal argues130, rights and obligations
are no longer defined based on nationality but on universal personhood.
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In the post-national citizenship model, citizenship moves away from nationhood to
personhood.131 Rights are expanded beyond those reinforced by national attribute and are now
extended to include individuals that were previously excluded. Post-national citizenship is a
postwar phenomenon facilitated by the increasing flow of goods and people especially the labor
migration that occurred after World War II. 132 The model moves away from fixed to fluid
boundaries. However, this does not mean that the state has fluid boundaries.133 The nation still
has the right to exclude. Importantly though, its right to exclude must be based on a firm
explanation as humanitarian arguments for migration play greater importance. All nations are
held accountable to the same human rights.
Based on the EU human rights framework, integration is seen as immigrants’
fundamental right. 134 Here it is important to distinguish between the terms assimilation and
integration. Assimilation means the total abandonment of one’s culture of origin.135 On the other
hand, integration allows the attachment to one’s original culture while at the same time
internalizing the behavioral standards of society136. Assimilation has been deemed as a negative
way of incorporating minorities into society. Although “assimilation” has been banned from the
official language, one should be careful and realize that the term “integration” which has
replaced it still indicates a certain degree of acculturation. Nowadays, the Nation State expects
migrants to learn the official language, respect the culture and values (CBP4) and many times
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comply with the majority’s way of life.137

2.2.1 Assimilation & Assimilationist Integration
Integration policies that follow the assimilationist perceptive claim blindness in relation
to the cultural and religious differences that groups have. 138 Based on the principle of equal
dignity for all citizens, “assimilationist” integration policies are built on a universalist policy
attributing the same rights to all, regardless of their cultural, linguistic and religious differences.
Thus, “equality is guaranteed by rigorous identical treatment, independent of differences”139. But
is the treatment identical? In the assimilationist perspective, it is expected that over time
differences will disappear. Thus, even if the purpose of the assimilationist integration perspective
is not the erasement of one’s culture, language and religion, in practice it could have the same
result as to what assimilation used to mean in the 19th century.
Assimilation as a concept first appeared during the large immigration waves of the
industrial-era in the late 19th century and was based on three assumptions. First, immigrants will
come to share a common culture with the majority as they will be given the same socioeconomic
opportunities. Secondly, the adoption of the majority’s culture will lead to the gradual
disappearance of the migrants’ native culture. Finally, once the process has begun it is
irreversible; it will inevitably lead to full assimilation.140Historically, the assimilationist approach
was most prominently used throughout the United States to deal with the European migration
waves prior to the 1970s.141 But there are also European examples.
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France is an example of the “assimilationist” integration approach in the European
Union. In the French Jacobin tradition, what matters is the relationship between the individual
and the state, without the interference of intermediaries. 142 Consequently, it should not be
possible to acknowledge differences in culture or religion in the public sphere. Based on the
notion of secularism, France passed a bill in 2004143 banning “the wearing of signs or clothes
showing a religious affiliation in schools, colleges, and public high schools”. Although the law
has been open to interpretation, it seems to be particularly targeting the veil and headscarf,
religious symbols mostly connected to the Muslim religion. Small crosses were accepted in
schools, which makes the policy rather questionable as crosses are mostly connected to the
Christian tradition. France’s majority is Christian, while its biggest minority is Muslim. Thus, it
is evident that France’s stance with this policy responded to the cultural majority expecting its
minority groups to assimilate.
Importantly, theorists like Able and Nee, have noted that “assimilation has come to be
viewed by social scientists as a worn-out theory, which imposed ethnocentric and patronizing
demands on minority peoples struggling to retain their cultural and ethnic integrity.”144 Thus,
assimilationist integration policies, the way they were practiced during the twentieth century,
have attracted a lot of criticism Nevertheless, in recent years, an increasing number of European
states expect migrants to learn the official language, respect the culture and values (CBP4) and
many times comply with the majority’s way of life.145
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2.2.2 Multiculturalism & Multiculturalist Integration
During the 1970s, the assimilationist rhetoric started to shift into a multicultural dialogue.
The multiculturalist perceptive of integration is based on the policy of difference stressing that
all citizens must have the right to live according to their culture and religion. 146 Thus, the most
important factor of this theory is its demand that “all groups should be recognized”147 . This
approach recognizes that universal laws adopted by the majority could be discriminatory for the
minority since they are designed by the majority. As Will Kymlicka notes, “the state unavoidably
promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others.”148 Thus, in order to treat
individuals fairly, differential policies should be introduced to re-establish equality.

149

Multiculturalism as an immigrant integration policy takes a step further and not only recognizes
the right of other individuals to express their differences but also demands from the government
to protect the minorities’ culture calling for varying degrees of proactive protection.150
In Europe, the “multiculturalist” approach is most commonly associated with the United
Kingdom or the Netherlands. 151 In the UK, the immigrant integration approach taken in the
1970s is exemplified by Roy Jenkins (1967), the then Home Secretary. Integration did not mean
immigrants losing their own features and national culture. I do not believe that we need a melting pot in this country,
which would transform everyone in a common mould, like a sample from a series of carbon copies of the tactless
vision that some might have of the British stereotype. I therefore define integration not like the levelling process of
assimilation but as equal opportunities, associated with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance 152
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However, starting in the 2000s a more secular and rather nationalistic approach was
followed. Based on the Robert Schuman Fondation 153 , The Nationality, Immigration, and
Asylum Act of 2002 in the UK put forward the symbolic strengthening of national identity. After
the Act, people seeking nationality had to take a citizen’s test claiming their knowledge of the
English language, the institutions, the history, and the law of Britain. Along the same lines,
Netherlands’ integration policy of TCNs changed also in 2002 following the assassination of
“iconic leader”154 Pim Fortuyn. In the Netherlands, the political elites aimed at achieving migrant
participation in mainstream institutions, Dutch-language acquisition and labor market
integration. 155 Generally, countries, like the Netherlands and the UK, that were traditionally
associated with the “multiculturalist” approach have altered their direction to integration towards
a more secular and nationalistic approach.

2.2.3 EU Stance
The official EU stance on the direction of immigrant integration policies remains rather
ambivalent. More specifically this ambivalence comes in relation to cultural diversity reflecting
the broader lack of consensus across Europe as analyzed above. This ambivalence is exemplified
in the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration; the guide that the European Union
has created for Member States to judge and asses their immigrant integration efforts. More
specifically, CBP8 states that “the practices of diverse cultures and religion as recognized under
the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be guaranteed” and the Council Conclusions state that
“full respect for the immigrants’ and their descendants’ own language and culture should be an
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important element of integration policy”156. However, CBP8 also stresses that Member States
should show “support for cultural and religious expressions that respect national and European
values, rights and laws”.157 This shows that even if the CBPs urge Member States to respect the
minorities’ culture, at the same time they stress that the respect should be limited not challenging
the cultural and linguistic monopoly granted to the majority.
Member States also have a responsibility to ensure that cultural and religious practices do not prevent
individual migrants from exercising other fundamental rights or from participating in the host society. This is
particularly important as it pertains to the rights and equality of women, the rights and interests of children and the
freedom to practice or not to practice a particular religion. 158

In the excerpt above, there is an emphasis on fundamental rights. However, one should not forget
that rights are defined according to EU standards thus they reflect the majority’s notion of what
rights mean. Additionally, without specifying what exactly is meant by fundamental rights,
Member States are allowed to interpret such directives as they please. We see that in some cases
Member States have implemented more demanding policies closer to acculturation or even
assimilation.159
This stance is linked to the ‘failures of multiculturalism’. In 2010, it was argued by many
politicians that multiculturalism had “utterly failed” as a European immigrant integration
policy. 160 Throughout the year, Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Cameron, and President
Sarkozy were all condemning multiculturalism. Cameron argued that multiculturalism “had
failed to promote a sense of common identity centered on the values of human rights, democracy,
social integration, and equality before the law.”161 Nevertheless, these policymakers were not the
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first ones to criticize the multiculturalist integration perspectives that characterized many
Western European countries. With the increase of “globalization” in the 1990s, many scholars
viewed “contemporary immigration as obliterating and undermining some traditional principles
of nation states.” 162 Overall, with increased migration, the multiculturalist perspective of
immigrant integration was deemed ineffective undermining the common sense of European and
national identity.
This lack of public consensus for multiculturalist policies could be associated with the
increase in the support of populist right-wing parties throughout Europe. In many European
countries like Austria, the Netherlands, and France, both in the 1990s and the 2010s, we see a big
increase in the support of right-wing parties. Right-wing parties across Europe preach against
globalization associating it with multiculturalism and overly liberal integration policies.163
The EU has suggested intercultural dialogue as a potential solution to the problem. The
European Commission Handbook on Integration has urged that governments encourage
intercultural and interreligious dialogue establishing dialogue platforms and providing financial
assistance if necessary in order to create more open-minded and less skeptical societies.164 At the
same time, the EU has focused on employment as an integral part for Nation-States’ immigrant
integration efforts. This focus appeared in the first steps towards an EU collective response to
migrant integration. In the First Annual Report on Migration and Integration and the Common
Basic Principles “access to employment” has become “the most important political priority
within national integration policies”165 perceived as a “key part to the integration process”166. In
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2016, the emphasis on employment for successful immigrant integration was reaffirmed with the
Action Plan167.

2.2.4 Structuralism
Here it is important to stress that both assimilationist and multiculturalist theories on
integration give a great emphasis on the agency of migrants. Nevertheless, as aforementioned,
the structure of the society could play a crucial role in their integration. It is not only about the
steps that immigrants will take towards their integration but also about how much the society is
willing to accept them. The structuralist theory emphasizes that socio-economic opportunities
available to migrants play an important role in their integration regardless of their individual
efforts to integrate. Migrants’ unequal access to housing or jobs, could hinder their ability to
integrate.168 As Portes and Borocz note, “the combination of different class origins and contexts
of reception gives rise to a plurality of settlement patterns” and integration outcomes.169
Portes and Borocz analyze three types of ‘contexts of reception’. First, an
overwhelmingly negative society in which the government takes a very adverse and restrictive
stance towards immigration and tries to suppress the influx altogether. In this model,
“immigrants are (also) negatively typified by employers, either as unsuitable labor or as suitable
only for menial jobs, a condition compounded by generalized prejudice among the native
population.”170 In such societal conditions immigrants are less likely to succeed. In a neutral
society, the government neither encourages not discourages migration and no strong stereotypes

166

European Commission, Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in The EU, 2004
European Commission, “Action Plan of the Integration of Third Country Nationals”, 2016.
168
Algan et al., “Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe”, 2012, p.6.
169
Portes & Borocz, “Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of
Incorporation”, International Migration Review 23, no.3, 1989, p. 621.
170
Ibid, p.618.
167

46
about migrants exist. Finally, in a positive society the government is positive about migration and
not only permits it but supports it through legal and material assistance. 171 Consequently,
depending on the ‘contexts of reception’ migrants’ integration could be hindered, not affected, or
supported.
An additional factor affecting the integration of migrants is social class. Portes and
Borocz divide immigrants in two categories: manual laborers and professionals. They argue that
in a negative society both categories have a hard time to integrate. First, employers are less likely
to hire migrants but also professionals face difficulties in acquiring the necessary licenses and
revalidating titles. In a neutral society, professionals are more likely to be culturally integrated
into society, as they can enter directly into their field. Manual laborers are still expected to face
some difficulties. Finally, in favorable societies both types of migrants have higher chances to
succeed since the government provides them with legal and material benefits.172 This shows that
immigrants labor market integration and employment is largely depended on society.
Portes and Borocz stress the importance that the structure of the society plays in the
integration of migrants. European institutions are very powerful, and they play a very important
role in the acceptance of migrants into the society and even the labor market. Many times, it does
not even matter how much immigrants will try and integrate, what matters is if the society is
positive towards immigrants allowing for their successful integration.
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2.3 Immigrant Integration Policies in the European Union
The European Union has realized that the integration of migrants can have positive
benefits for the European development. If migrants are successfully integrated into the society,
they can actively contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political development of
European societies. The successful integration of immigrants into the host society can lead to the
outmost gain of legal migration. Thus, failure to enable immigrants’ potential would be a
massive waste of resources, both at the individual level and more generally for the European
economy and society as a whole. 173 To this understanding, the European Union has been
supporting national and local policies to promote policy coordination, exchange of knowledge
and financial resources, even if Member States are the ones primarily responsible for integration.
The European Union cooperation on the integration of non- EU nationals started with the
adoption of the Tampere Programme in 1999 174 . The Tampere conclusions in 1999 by the
European Council led to the adoption of two legally-binding Council Directives on the Right to
Family Reunification 175 and the status of Third Country Nationals who are Long-term
Residents176 in 2003. The Directive on Long-term Residents states that:
The integration of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member States is a key element in
promoting economic and social cohesion [..and] in order to constitute a genuine instrument for the integration of
long-term residents into the society in which they live, long-term residents should enjoy equality of treatment with
citizens of the Member State in a wide range of economic and social matters.

Thus, according to the directive a secure legal status and non-discrimination will allow for the
successful integration of migrants. The legislation emphasizes on non-discrimination in the areas
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of employment, equal working conditions, education and training, recognition of qualifications,
social protection defined by national law, equal tax benefits, and equality of access to goods and
services.177 In both of these directives, “integration conditions are seen as a necessary condition
for the stability and social cohesion in European societies”.178
During the same time, two networks were created in order to support the development of
the European integration policies. The first one was the National Contact Points on Integration in
2002 that was later renamed as the European Integration Network in 2016 and has been
responsible to shape the European migration integration agenda. The second, called the European
Migration Network (EMN)179 created in 2003 was responsible for the provision of information to
policymakers and citizens through reports and studies. Importantly, the first financial resource
promoting integration measures came in 2003 with the Preparatory Actions for Integration of
Third Country Nationals (INTI). The agenda included the promotion of local activities, as well as
the strengthening of networks, exchange of information, and good practices between Member
States, their regional and local authorities and other stakeholders.
The first steps towards a common immigrant integration policy among Member States
came in 2004 with the adoption of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration
Policy in the EU180 by the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This policy was adopted under the
Hague Programme in 2004. The CBPs were described as a “simple non-binding but thoughtful
guide of basic principles against which [Member States] can judge and assess their own
[integration] efforts”181. Member States renewed their commitment to such principles in 2014,
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where integration was reaffirmed as a long-term and multi-faceted commitment. Based on the
CBPs, the integration of immigrants is comprised of 11 principles. First and foremost, the
Council states that “integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all
migrants and residents of Member States”, stressing that:
Everyone resident in the EU must adapt and adhere closely to the values of the European Union, as well as to
member states’ laws. The provision and values enshrined in the European Treaties serve as both baseline and
compass, as they are common to the Member States.182

CBPs include the “respect for the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union,
which enshrine the concepts of dignity, freedom, equality and non-discrimination, solidarity,
citizens’ rights and justice’183 The document continues emphasizing that “views and opinions
which may not be compatible with such basic values might hinder the integration of immigrants
into their new host society”. The CBPs go on to emphasize the importance of employment;
knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions (CBP4); education;
participation in the democratic process; and equal access to public goods and services. Finally,
they conclude that clear indicators and evaluation mechanisms are of outmost importance in the
development of goals and improved policy. All of the above aim at the effective integration of
immigrants.
In 2009, a platform of dialogue was created – European Integration Forum – between
civil society organization and European institutions, which in 2015 became the European
Migration Forum184. Also, the European Fund for the Integration of TCNs (EIF) 185 was created
that ran between 2007 and 2013; it was later included in the Asylum Migration and Integration
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Fund (AMIF)186. The European Network of Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants
(CLIP)187 created in 2007 is an example of an initiative at the local level to promote migrant
integration. These initiatives show an effort to help the integration of immigrants at the local
level aiming to promote a common EU direction to immigrant integration.
The European Handbook on Integration 188 was published for the third time in 2010,
published earlier in 2007 and 2004, aiming at the effective guidance of policy-makers and
practitioners on immigrant integration based on EU standards. In the handbook the core chapters
discuss integration programs and civic participation. The same year, at the Zaragoza Ministerial
Conference189, a common set of integration indicators was adopted in order to better monitor the
integration policies across Europe. Interestingly, the conference started with a chapter on
‘promoting European values’. We can see that civic participation is central in the EU approach to
integration with the respect & promotion of EU values being an integral part of what civic
integration means.
The “European Web Site on Integration: Migrant Integration Information and good
practices”190 launched in 2009 was an important step to effectively communicate information
relating to immigrant integration with practitioners and other integration stakeholders. The Web
Site features news, good practices, funding opportunities and country specific research on
national governance structures and evaluation on integration outcomes for the 28 Member States.
Finally, it includes Europe’s overall research on integration. With the European Web Site on
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Integration, Europe’s efforts towards immigrant integration are readily available for anyone
interested in searching and getting easily informed about EU’s and individual EU countries’
forthcoming integration steps.
In 2007, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 191 was formed – replacing the
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) dating back in 1998 – to
strengthen the protection of fundamental rights. The agency includes findings, knowledge, and
advice from independent and comparative research many times directly related to immigrants
and refugees to raise awareness of their rights. On the legislative level, the European Union
implemented a Framework Decision in 2008 “on combating certain forms and expressions of
racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law” 192, which Member States were obliged to
implement in their national laws by 2010. Additionally, in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon came into
force after its adoption in 2007; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union made
it legally binding. It was the first time that the primary law of the European Union provided a
legal basis for the promotion of immigrant integration at the European level, although the
immigrant integration policies still remained at the discretion of the Member States. The EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights promoted the freedom of speech and religion, as well as the
rights of equality and non-discrimination; integral rights for the successful integration of
immigrants.
The Stockholm Programme 193 set out the European Union’s priorities for the area of
justice, freedom and security building on the achievements of the Tampere and Hague programs
for the period of 2010-2014. It set as a priority the effective knowledge, exchange, and
191
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coordination with other relevant policy areas, such as employment (Europe 2020 194) and social
inclusion (EU Youth Strategy for period 2010-2018195). In 2011, the European Agenda for the
Integration of TCNs 196 was created targeting specific integration aspects that needed to be
prioritized. Importantly, it stated that “well integrated migrants enrich the EU economically and
culturally”. The European Agenda came as a replacement to the Common Agenda for Integration
responding to increased migration and cultural diversity in recent years. In 2014, the Asylum,
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)197 was adopted to run until 2020 in order to finance
immigrant integration. The European Agenda for Integration focused on four specific factors of
immigrant integration: anti-discrimination, and economic, social, and cultural participation.
In 2016, the Action Plan198 on the integration of third country nationals was created. The
Action Plan stated that it is important for people rightfully and legitimately residing in Europe to
be able to participate and contribute in society as it will be “key to the future well-being,
prosperity and cohesion of European societies.” Stressing the increasing levels of discrimination,
prejudice, racism and xenophobia, the European Commission stated that it is Europe’s legal,
moral and economic imperatives to uphold fundamental rights, values and freedoms. The
European Commission concluded that the integration of immigrants is a common interest to all
Member States and that investing in immigrant integration policies will lead to positive long-run
effects. The policy priorities set by the Action Plan focus on pre-departure and pre-arrival
measures; education; labour market & vocational training; access to basic services; and active
participation and social inclusion. Such goals will be achieved through policies, funding
opportunities, mutual learning initiatives and resources such as websites and reports.
European Commission, “Europe 2020 strategy: A strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth”, 2010.
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Finally, on November of 2017, the European Union opened a 25-million-euro worth call
for proposals. Projects are expected to run from 2018 to 2021. The AMIF call for proposals is
comprised of five funding themes reflecting the policy priorities identified by the Action Plan.
The themes are the following: raising awareness on migrant’s contribution to EU societies;
community building at the local level, including volunteering activities; pre-departure and postarrival support for the integration of persons in need of international protection; promotion of
swift integration of TCNs into the labor market; integration of victims of trafficking in human
beings. Thus, we can see that the current EU steps of immigrant integration focus on the socioeconomic participation of immigrants in their host countries.
As mentioned above, the European agenda emphasizes on the integration of migrants
under the fulfillment of immigrants’ rights and the benefits of the host country. However, it can
be unclear as of what exactly the integration of immigrants entails. Nevertheless, one can argue
that all the aforementioned, proposed policies focus on the nations’ commitment to equal
opportunities, equal treatment and equal access to services. On same line, immigrants are
expected to integrate and enable their skills to actively participate in the host countries and
contribute to their development. Thus, integration is a two-way process of mutual
accommodation but also mutual benefit by all migrants and residents of Member States. The
successful integration of immigrants will be achieved with the collaboration of the public sector,
civil society and private-sector organizations.
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2.4 Measuring Immigrant Integration
In this section, I will analyze the multiple dimensions of integration policies as identified
by the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Although other indices might exist using
some similar indicators, MIPEX is the only index that uses up-to-date, comprehensive research
data and analysis. MIPEX can be used as an effective tool to assess, compare and improve
integration policy. MIPEX gives full access to its results and allows researchers to delve into the
multiple factors that affect the integration of immigrants. It also allows for the analysis of
changes in policy.
MIPEX looks at 167 policy indicators in order to evaluate and compare the policies that
governments implement to integrate migrants at the countries analyzed. It looks at all the EU
Member States and also Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. It analyzes eight policy areas of integration: labour
market mobility, education of children, political participation, family reunion, access to
nationality, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination. For each policy area MIPEX
identifies the highest European and international standards drawn from the Council of European
Conventions, European Union Directives and international conventions. If only minimum
standards exist, MIPEX uses European-wide policy recommendations.

2.4.1 Labour Market Mobility
This policy area examines if legally-resident foreign citizens have equal workers’ rights
and opportunities in relation to nationals’ access to jobs and if they are able to improve their
skills. This policy area was created in response to the European Commission’s ten year vision for
the future of vocational education and training in a Communication titled ‘A new impetus for
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European cooperation in vocational education and training to support the Europe 2020
strategy’ 199 Thus, economic and employment guidelines for the integration of migrants were
revised according to the Europe 2020 strategy. According to guideline 8, the aim is to “develop a
skilled workforce responding to labour market needs, promoting job quality and lifelong
learning”.200 Successful labour market outcomes for immigrants are key in their success in the
receiving society and are the most important step towards integration. 201 This policy area is
divided in four indicators and its indicator is then subdivided in several others.
(1) Access: Measures the extent to which migrant workers and their families have access to and
are able to change jobs in all sectors in relation to national workers.
a. Immediate Access to Labour Market
b. Access to Private Sector
c. Access to Public Sector
d. Immediate Access to Self-employment
e. Access to Full self-employment
Immediate access examines if all or some categories of foreign residents (permanent residents,
residents on temporary work permits, residents on family reunion permits) have equal access to
employment or self-employment respectively. Access examines the extent to which the
conditions are equal.
(2) Access to general support: Measures the extent to which migrant workers and their families
are able to improve and get recognized the same skills and qualifications in relation to
national workers.
European Commission, “A new impetus for European cooperation in Vocational Education and Training to
support the Europe 2020 strategy”, 2010.
200
European Commission, “Europe2020, Integrated guidelines for the economic and employment policies of the
Members” 2010.
201
Lodovici, “Making a success of integrating immigrants in the labour market”, 2010.
199

56
a. Public Employment Services
b. Education & Vocational Training
c. Study Grants
d. Recognition of Academic Qualifications
e. Recognition of Professional Qualifications
f. Validation of Skills
(3) Targeted Support: Measures the extent to which migrants can have their specific needs
addressed as workers born and trained abroad through different policies.
a. State Facilitation of Recognition Qualifications
b. Economic Integration measures of TCNs
c. Economic Integration measures of youth and women
d. Support to access public employment services
e. Active Information policy
(4) Workers’ rights: Measures the extent to which migrants are enjoying the same work and
social security rights like national workers.
a. Membership in Trade Unions and Work-related Negotiation Bodies
b. Access to Social Security
c. Access to Housing
d. Working Conditions

2.4.2 Family Reunion for Foreign Citizens
This policy area analyzes the extent to which legally-resident foreign citizens have a right
to reunite with their families. The policy area was created in response to the right to family and

57
family life under European and international law. Importantly, the EU Family Reunion
Directive202 established the right to family reunion for non-EU sponsors and their families. The
Directive establishes the right of immigrants to bring their non-EU national spouse, under-age
children and the children of their spouse to the EU State in which they reside. The Family
Reunion for Foreign Citizens policy area measures the extent to which countries promote this
right as a means to promote integration.
(1) Eligibility: Measures if all legal foreign residents are able to apply to sponsor their whole
family
(2) Conditions for Acquisition of Status: Measures what are the pre-entry, post-entry and other
conditions for the acquisition of status in relation to nationals.
(3) Security of Status: Measures if the state protects applicants from discretionary procedures.
(4) Rights Associated with Status: Measures if family members enjoy the same residence and
socio-economic rights as their sponsor.

2.4.3 Education
This policy area assesses if immigrant children are encouraged to achieve and develop
their skills in school in comparison to the children of nationals. OECD’s Programme for
International Student Assessment 203 (PISA) is a very useful source for the measurement of
educational attainment as part of the integration of immigrant children across countries. Studies
have shown that education systems are more successful in the integration of immigrants if they
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target their needs. Also, immigrants do better when education is compulsory for a longer period
of time, when late ability tracking exists, and there are more teaching hours.204
(1) Access: Measures if all immigrant children –with or without legal status – have equal access
to all levels of education
(2) Targeting Needs: Measures the extent that immigrant children, parents and their teachers are
provided with specific support in order to address their education needs.
(3) New Opportunities: Measures the extent to which immigrant languages and cultures are
cultivated in school enriching the school environment.
(4) Intercultural Education for All: Measures if all pupils and teachers are supported to learn and
work together in a diverse society.

2.4.4 Political Participation
This policy area evaluates if legally-resident foreign citizens enjoy the same rights to
participation in political life as national citizens. The policy area was created in response to the
European Parliament advocating for voting rights at the local level for all foreign residents since
1996.205 However, even if both the European Parliament and the European Commission have
advocated for “civic participation”206, they have not imposed it on Member States as they argue
that it is outside the Community competences defined in the European Treaties. Importantly, in
the CBPs, which form the foundations of EU initiatives in the field of integration, it is stated that
“The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration
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policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration” 207(CBP 9)
(1) Electoral Rights: Measures if legally-resident foreign citizens are allowed to vote and stand
as candidates in all kinds of elections in comparison to national citizens.
(2) Political Liberties: Measures if legally-resident foreign citizens are able to join and form
political parties and associations in relation to national citizens.
(3) Consultative Bodies: Measures if these strong and independent advisory bodies are
comprised of immigrant representatives or associations.
(4) Implementation Policies: Measures if there are campaigns and/or funds in place to encourage
immigrants and their associations to participate in political life.

2.4.5 Permanent Residency
This policy area analyzes the extent that temporary-legal foreign residents have access to
a long-term residence permit. The policy area was created in response to the 2003 Council
Directive which states that the status of long-term residency208 should be awarded to a person of
foreign origin who has lived legally in the European Union more than five years. This status
allows equal treatment and rights as nationals in the access to employment and self-employed
activity, education and vocational training, social protection and assistance, access to goods and
services. The granting of permanent residency to TCNs who have been legally residing in
Europe is important in promoting their integration and coming closer to economic, social,
cultural, and political cohesion. The share of TCNs that acquire permanent residence is one of
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the proposed EU indicators of immigrant integration in the area of ‘active citizenship’.209
(1) Eligibility: Measures if all temporary legal residents are eligible to apply for a long-term
residence permit.
(2) Conditions for Acquisition of Status: Measures if applicants of long-term residency status
have to fulfil the same conditions as European nationals.
(3) Security of Status: Measures the extent to which the state protects applicants from
discretionary procedures.
(4) Rights Associated with Status: Measures the extent to which long-term residents are granted
the same socio-economic rights in comparison to European nationals.

2.4.6 Access to Nationality
This policy area examines if legal residents are encouraged to naturalize and if their
children who are born in the country are entitled to become full citizens. This policy area was
created in response to the many times all two complicated naturalization processes that exist.
Although it is important for the naturalization process to ensure that perspective new members of
the society meet the necessary requirements to become successful citizens, a process that is too
complicated can be counterproductive. Thus, such a process can inhibit the very integration it
seeks to facilitate. It has been found that naturalization leads to better employment outcomes and
higher levels of social and political participation.210,211
(1) Eligibility: Measures the length of time that immigrants must wait in order to naturalize. It
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also looks if children and grandchildren born in the country are entitled to become citizens.
(2) Conditions for Acquisition: Measures the extent that immigrants are encouraged to succeed
through the conditions required for naturalization.
(3) Security of Status: Measures the extent to which the country protects applicants from
discretionary procedures.
(4) Dual Nationality: Measures if countries allow naturalizing migrants and their children to be
citizens of more than one country.

2.4.7 Anti-discrimination
This policy area examines if all residents have effective legal protection from racial,
ethnic, religious and nationality discrimination in all areas of life. This policy area was created in
response to the increasingly negative sentiment against immigrants and wants to examine if and
how immigrants perceive discrimination and the governments’ response. Importantly,
governments are not able to directly control discrimination. However, they can respond to
discrimination by providing access to justice and creating effective procedures to alleviate the
experience of discrimination.
(1) Definitions and Concepts: Measures if all residents are protected from racial, ethnic,
religious, and nationality discrimination under the law.
(2) Fields of Application: Measures if the law tackles all areas of life.
(3) Enforcement Mechanisms: Measures if victims of discrimination are encouraged to bring
forward their case.
(4) Equality Policies: Measures if all residents are able to benefit from the government’s
commitments to equality and independent equality policies.
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2.4.8 Health
This policy examines the extent to which the health care system is responsive to
immigrants’ needs. It was created with the collaboration of MPG (Migration Policy Group), IOM
(International Organization for Migration), and COST Action ADAPT (Adapting European
Health Services to Diversity). COST is the European Association for European Cooperation in
Science and Technology. This policy area responds to the recommendation of the Council of
Europe in 2011 on mobility, migration and access to health care. 212 The IOM created its own
project ‘Equi-Health’213 to supplement the financing of the Health strand. IOM’s project is cofinanced by the EU’s Directorate-General Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) through the
Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency (CHAFEA). Overall, health
policies have been added only recently to Europe’s integration policy agenda.
(1) Entitlement to Health Services: Measures if health services are entitled equally between
immigrants and nationals.
(2) Policies to Facilitate Access: Measures the extent that policies facilitate migrants’ access to
health entitlements.
(3) Responsive Health Services: Measures the extent that policies are becoming more responsive
to immigrants’ needs.
(4) Measures to Achieve Change: Measures government’s support to mare health services more
responsive to immigrants’ needs
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2.5 – Conclusion
The integration of third-country nationals has been at the center of EU policy since the
1990s. Since then, there have been a lot of normative developments and policy changes that are
connected to the literature around integration. Integration is part of migration management
aiming to secure rights, security, and social inclusion to third-country nationals. As emphasized
in the CBP, integration is seen as dynamic two-way that is facilitated by both migrants and the
member states. Thus, even if the EU has been aiming towards a collective response to migration
and immigrant integration, member states are still the ones responsible for immigrant integration.
In its process of converge, the EU has increasingly been using soft-law governance techniques.
Employment has been given great emphasis in this process. In regard to migrants’ cultural
integration there is great ambivalence which reflects the complicated national histories
responding to minorities and new immigrants in different EU states. The literature around
immigrants and the integration of migrants has been extensive. There has been a lot of academic
debate about how immigrant integration works, the efficacy of certain approaches to immigrant
integration, and whether or not integration policies for immigrants are converging. On the policy
level, the EU has commissioned some researchers to find the best indicators that determine
immigrant integration. MIPEX is the most effective tool yet developed analyzing immigrant
integration in eight policy areas. Overall, starting in the 1990s, Europe has aimed at the creation
of a common EU policy on migration and immigrant integration and has taken important steps
towards its aim.
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Chapter Three: Labor Market Impact of Immigrant Integration
3.1 Introduction
While migration is increasing, the debates around its effect on the labor market have been
extensive. Most theorists conclude on the overall positive effects of migration on the labor
market. In relation to the impact of migration on the wages and employment of native workers,
the literature has also shown that the impact is either zero or positive. Recently, the literature has
developed arguing for immigrants’ positive contribution to society and development with their
successful integration. However, there has been limited economic research examining how the
integration of migrants will specifically affect the wages and employment of native workers.
In this chapter I will examine the impact of immigrant integration policies on labor
market outcomes, specifically the employment rate. I will look at the effect of the labor market
immigrant integration as defined by The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 214 on the
total employment rate and on the employment rate of different subgroups for various EU
countries. First, I will undertake a regression analysis for seventeen EU countries. Then, I will
take a deeper look at the relationship between employment and labor market immigrant
integration for six different countries: Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK;
countries that have been at the center of the immigrant integration debate. These steps will allow
me to have a clearer picture of the impact of labor market immigrant integration on the
employment of the labor force as a whole and for various groups.
The European Union has commissioned some researchers in order to find the best
indicators that determine the success of immigrant integration and the factors that determine the
immigrant integration outcomes. MIPEX is the most effective tool that has been developed. It
analyzes integration in eight policy areas - labour market mobility, education of children,
214
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political participation, family reunion, access to nationality, health, permanent residence and
anti-discrimination –based on the highest European and international standards drawn from the
Council of European Conventions, European Union Directives and international conventions.215
I chose to focus on labor market immigrant integration since its importance has been
increasingly emphasized in the EU.216 The EU has been aiming towards a collective response to
migration and immigrant integration with the first step taken in 1999.217 However, after 2004, the
EU started taking important steps towards a collective response to immigrant integration and
since then labor market immigrant integration has been emphasized as an integral part of the
process. The First Annual Report on Migration and Integration218, published in 2004, highlighted
that the “access to employment” is “the most important political priority within national
integration policies”. “Access to Employment” also appeared in the Common Basic Principles,
the same year, as a “key part of the integration process”219 making immigrants’ contributions to
society visible (CBP3). As recently as 2016220, employment was again highlighted as a core
element of the immigrant integration process with the European Commission urging countries to
focus their efforts on the promotion of labour market integration of third-country nationals.
Labor market integration for migrants has been at the center of immigrant integration policies
from the beginning since today.
Further, I chose to examine the impact of the integration of migrants on the total
employment since there has been a great rhetoric around immigrants taking jobs away from
natives. 221 Total employment 222 will be disaggregated in non-EU 223 , low-skill 224 , young 225 ,
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old226, and female227 employment. Total employment and the disaggregations of employment
will be measured by looking at the respective employment rates as calculated from Eurostat
data 228 . Disaggregating the total employment rate in different subgroups will allow me to
examine how labor market immigrant integration might have differently affected the
employment of various groups. As some economists have argued, some groups are
disproportionately affected by immigration. Borjas has repeatedly emphasized the negative
impact on the low-skill labor force.229 This disaggregation will allow me to examine if and how
different groups are affected by labor market immigrant integration.
My results are based on the time period of 2007-2014. These are the years that data from
MIPEX, the most crucial variable, are available. In order to choose the countries for my research
I ranked them according to two measures. First, their rank as a destination country in the EU
from 2007-2014 and second their rank according to their performance in Labor Market
Immigrant Integration (MIPEXL) from the same time period. I limited my analysis to the first 15
countries of each ranking; 11 countries were both in the destination ranking and the MIPEXL
ranking. An additional 8 countries were either in the top-15 of the destination ranking or the
MIPEXL ranking. This led me to an overall 19 countries. Croatia and Romania had to be
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excluded from the sample as there is limited data for their MIPEXL performance throughout
these years. Overall, this led me to have a sample size of 17 countries.

3.2 Regression Analysis
My analysis uses panel data, the analysis of data over time, for 17 countries over 20072014 time period. One can estimate panel data using three different methods; 1) Pooled Data
OLS, 2) Fixed Effects, 3) Random Effects. The OLS estimation is no longer the most efficient
method of estimation because it is very likely to be biased. 230 Thus, in order to decide if I should
use a fixed effects model or a random effects model, I run the Hausman test. The Hausman test
analyzes if there is a correlation between the unique errors and the regressors in the model. If no
correlation between the two exists (the null hypothesis), then the Hausman test will suggest the
random effects model. If the p-value is less than 0.05, we should reject the null hypothesis.
According to the results listed below, the null hypothesis was accepted thus the random-effectsmodel was the one suggested for my panel data.
230
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This figure shows the Hausman test results for the total employment rate of the seventeen
EU countries. I run the test of all the different dependent variables and came up with the same
results. Thus, I will be running six different random effects models. My dependent variable will
change: total, non-EU, low-skill, young, old, and female employment.231 In the random effects
models, I have accounted for different determinants of employment. These include: the inflation
rate (annual percentage)232, GDP growth (annual percentage)233, trade (percentage of GDP)234,
size of the service sector measured by gross value added at current basic prices (in millions of
national currency)235, bargaining power of unions measured by trade union density rate (%)236,
and last but not least MIPEXL measured by a ranking number out of 100237.
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3.2.1 Model 1: Total Employment Rate and MIPEXL

Etotalit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit

The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is
our variable of interest and total employment rate is our dependent variable. Rest of X’s in this
model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit.

For total employment we can see that the service sector plays a really important role
negatively affecting it causing a 7.15% negative change. This result could be due to the fact that
the labour market is undergoing a change in the kinds of jobs that are created, which leads to a
negative impact on employment until the skills of the labour force change. Inflation positively
affects the total employment rate, which is what we would expect. As inflation increases, the
price level and output increase leading to increased employment. MIPEXL, which is the
determinant of employment we are paying closer attention to, positively affects the employment
of the total labor force causing an 8.72% change. This result is what was expected from our
theory. Labor market immigrant integration will positively affect the employment rate of the
total labor force as it will complementary respond to the labour market leading to increased level
of output and thus increased wages and employment. Trade openness negatively effects the total
employment; a result that was expected. Trade openness is associated with higher unemployment
and wage inequality.
The rest of the determinants are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we can see that
bargaining power has a slight negative effect on employment, which is an expected result as
unions demand higher wages expecting a small drop in the overall employment. Unions utility
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will increase if the demand curve for labour is inelastic because the wage-employment trade-off
will be minimized. Finally, growth also negatively effects total employment; a rather surprising
result. We could expect growth to positively affect employment.

3.2.2 Model 2: Non-EU Employment Rate and MIPEXL

Eneuit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit

The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is
our variable of interest and non-EU employment rate is our dependent variable. Rest of X’s in
this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit.

For non-EU employment we can see that the services sector plays a really important role
negatively affecting non-EU employment. This could result as there has been a change in the
jobs created, which leads to a negative effect in employment until the skills of the non-EU labour
force change. For example, it could be because non-EU workers do not speak the native
language thus they are not able to be incorporated in the service sector where language plays
such an integral part. The bargaining power of unions negatively affects the employment of nonEU workers causing a negative change of 21.8%. This could be because the demand curve for
non-EU workers is more elastic thus is more negatively affected in comparison to total
employment. Also, unions could be more focused on the rights of the native labor force causing
adverse effects for the immigrant labor force. Inflation causes a positive change of 5.4%, an
expected result as more inflation means higher price level and output and thus employment.
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Trade openness negative effects the employment of non-EU workers. As said, trade openness is
associated with higher unemployment and wage inequality.
GDP growth and MIPEXL are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, growth has a
negative impact on non-EU employment. MIPEXL positively affects the employment of non-EU
workers causing a small change of 2.3%. We would expect MIPEXL to be statistically
significant and have a greater positive impact on non-EU employment as MIPEXL is designed to
integrate migrants into the labor force and thus we would expect to boost their employment. Our
results could be explained because according to MIPEX238, even if labour market policies focus
on helping immigrants to find a job they mostly succeed after 10+ years and they also offer jobs
of lower quality, below migrants’ qualification or below the poverty line. Thus, labor market
integration policies are not yet very effective in successfully integrating immigrants.

3.2.3 Model 3: Low-Skilled Employment Rate and MIPEXL

Elowit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit

The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is
our variable of interest and low-skilled employment rate is our dependent variable. Rest of X’s in
this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit.

For the low-skilled labor force, the service sector negatively impacts employment. The
impact is less than the total employment rate. This result is in alignment with our expectations as
more and more low-skilled labour force in the EU is employed in the service sector. Trade also
238
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plays an important role adversely affecting low-skilled employment causing a 9.29% negative
change. Trade openness makes the market more competitive and jobs at the low-end of the
spectrum are increasingly moving to countries with less expensive labour. Additionally, the EU
labor market is increasingly demanding more professional labour. Inflation positively affects the
employment of the low-skilled labor force in the same line as it affects the employment of the
total labor force.
The rest of the determinants are statistically insignificant. MIPEXL, although statistically
insignificant, positively affects the employment of low-skilled workers causing a 7.87% change.
This is in alignment with our expected results as, with labour market immigrant integration, the
labour market is more efficient and low-skilled workers are positively affected. Bargaining
power positively affects low-skilled workers. This result, if statistically significant, could mean
that unions are effective in benefiting disadvantaged labor force groups like the low-skilled. GDP
growth also positively affects the employment of low-skilled persons. This could mean not only
that growth occurred but that it also occurred in sectors that needed low-skilled labour.

3.2.4 Model 4: Young Labor Force Employment Rate and MIPEXL

Eyoungit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit

The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is
our variable of interest and the employment rate of the young labor force is our dependent
variable. Rest of X’s in this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit.
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For the young labour force, the service sector has a significant and important negative impact on
their employment. This could be caused as the young labour force is increasingly more educated
and their employment is mostly determined by higher-level jobs. Trade openness also negatively
impacts the employment of the young labor force. We can see that trade openness affects the
young labour force at a greater rate than the total labour force. This could be caused because the
demand for young labor force is more elastic due to greater substitutability. Inflation positively
affects the employment of young people for the reasons mentioned earlier.
All other factors are statistically insignificant. MIPEXL, although statistically
insignificant, positively affects the employment of young workers with a 6.87% change.
Bargaining power negatively affects the employment of young workers. This result, if
statistically significant, could be due to the fact that unions are balancing a wage-employment
trade-off. Since, younger workers would be the ones not yet employed or the ones lastly
employed, they are the ones most likely affected by this trade-off. Finally, GDP growth
negatively affects the employment of young workers; a result not expected.

3.2.5 Model 5: Old Labor Force Employment Rate and MIPEXL

Eoldit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit

The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is
our variable of interest and the employment rate of the old labor force is our dependent variable.
Rest of X’s in this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit.
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The employment of the old labour force is significantly and positively affected by
MIPEXL causing an 18.7% positive change. This is a rather interesting finding, but it could be
that the non-EU labour force integration is highly complementary to older workers and their
successful integration boosts this complementarity. Trade openness also results in positive
effects for the employment of the old labor force. This is a surprising finding as the old labor
force is the only one positively affected by trade openness. The rest of the determinants are
statistically insignificant.

3.2.6 Model 6: Female Labor Force Employment Rate and MIPEXL

Efemaleit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit

The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is
our variable of interest and the employment rate of the female labor force is our dependent
variable. Rest of X’s in this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit.

Looking at the female labor force employment rate, we can see that MIPEXL, one of the
two most statistical significant determinants of female employment, is causing a 9.96% positive
change to the employment of the female labor force. This effect could happen as non-EU labor
force is over-represented in the service sector and also in jobs where the employer is the
household239. With the non-EU labor force employed in the household, women have a greater
chance to be employed in the labor market as they do not need to do domestic work. However,

Eichhorst et al., “The Integration of Migrants and its Effects on the Labour Market”, IZA Research Report No.
40, 2011.
239
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the service sector negatively impacts the employment of female labor force. This is a rather
surprising result as according to the World Bank 84.08%240 of the total female labor force in the
EU were employed in the service sector. Thus, we would expect that an increase in the service
sector would positively affect the female employment. Last but not least, inflation has a positive
impact on female employment. The rest of the variables are not statistically significant.

Overall, focusing at MIPEXL we can conclude that from the random effects model
regression analysis it is a determinant with statistical significance for the total employment of the
seventeen EU-country labor force causing on average an 8.72% positive change. Disaggregating
the total employment in different groups, MIPEXL positively affects all the disaggregations of
employment. However, for the non-EU, low, and young labor force the effects of the MIPEXL
policies are not statistically significant.
According to MIPEX241, most labour market policies focus on helping migrants find a
job. However, most of them succeed after 10+ years and they also offer jobs of lower quality,
below migrants’ qualifications or below the poverty line. Most policies provide basic
information and access to most types of jobs, self-employment and trainings. Traditional
migration countries and most Western European countries are increasingly investing in more
effective general and targeted programs. However, a lot of them are too new or small to reach the
groups most in need. Overall, very few countries have a comprehensive integration strategy; nor
does the EU. Thus, all of the above reasons could explain our results. Also, having had a larger
time period our results could be significantly different.
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3.3 Individual Country Analysis
In this section I look at specific countries and I will analyze the correlation between labor
market immigrant integration policies and employment. The correlation coefficients will allow
me to see the statistical relationship between MIPEXL and employment in total and
disaggregated for different subgroups. From the table below, we can see that for most countries
there is a negative correlation between the total employment of the labor force and MIPEXL.
Countries with a positive correlation between total employment and MIPEXL are Austria,
Germany, Netherlands and Poland. For my extensive analysis, I will look more closely at
Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Expect Sweden, these countries
have been central countries in the integration literature for their different approaches to
integration.242 Sweden is included in my country analysis as it is the country ranked 1 st for its
MIPEXL polices.

242

See chapter two, section 2.2, p.35

78
3.3.1 Austria AT
Austria is a country with a long history of migration243, who despite having migrants,
only in the last ten years has incorporated immigrant integration in its national policymaking. 244
Austria was one of the countries that took part in the Gastarbeiter (guest worker) program in the
1960s accepting many temporary workers that later stayed creating Austria’s first large foreign
population. 245 Throughout the Cold War, Austria received refugees from Eastern European
countries, and in the 1990s, a massive influx of Yugoslavian refugees.246 In Austria there has
been a high level of anti-immigrant sentiment, which has been slightly decreasing in recent
years. 247 For the period of 2007–2014, Austria is ranking 11th out of 17 EU-countries as an
immigrant destination and 14th out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration
policies.
Around 1/3 of working-age non-EU citizens are not in employment, education, or
training; a ratio which is common across the EU248. Over the past decade, Austria’s MIPEXL
score has increased dramatically. It increased from 42/100 in 2007 to 64/100 in 2014. This
dramatic increase was mostly driven by the great change in targeted support which increased
from 10/100 in 2007 to 80/100 in 2014. Austria’s public employment service (AMS), the
Integration Fund (OIF), and the 2010 Integration Plan created many new programs to improve
the position of low- and high- skilled immigrants. However, in Austria it is still hard for migrants
to get their skills & foreign degrees recognized. Also, the access to public sector, self-
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employment, and study grants is limited. Thus, we could argue that there is skill-mismatch with
many of migrants’ potential being wasted.

We can see from the graphs above that MIPEXL policies have a strong positive
correlation with the employment of the total labor force. This result goes in alignment with the
ideal results from integration policies positively affecting the employment of the labor force.
However, there is significant negative correlation between the low-skilled overall labor force and
MIPEXL policies. Some economists have argued that low-skilled workers are one of the groups
most affected by immigration, which according to this correlation could be proof for the Austrian
labor market. Interestingly, there is a small negative correlation between MIPEXL and the
employment of non-EU workers. Since 2011, labor market integration policies have significantly
improved, however there are still improvements to be made. Targeted support has increased
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dramatically making it easier for non-EU workers to get their needs addressed as workers born
and trained abroad. However, it is still hard for immigrants to get their skills recognized.

3.3.2 France FR
France has been a country of net migration since the 1950s. It is one of Europe’s oldest
immigration countries with around 1/4th of its population having an immigrant background.249
However, a sizeable minority of the overall French population holds anti-immigrant attitudes.250
France is seen as the prototype of assimilationist integration policies in the EU, where the
permanent nature of immigration is accepted but also the immigrant population is expected to
assimilate with the majority. According to the French Jacobin tradition, what matters is the
relationship between the individual and the state, without the interference of intermediaries.251
For the period of 2007–2014, France is ranking 4th out of 17 EU-countries as an immigrant
destination and 15th out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration policies.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, across Europe there has been a consensus that labor
market integration is of outmost importance. In France, in 2003, a new integration policy was
formulated, in which language skills and education were considered even more important than
the incorporation into the labor market. The idea behind this policy direction was that once
migrants speak the native language and have acquired professional skills, their incorporation into
the labor market will be easier.252
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France restricts and delays labor market integration more than most of EU countries.
There is an estimated 5.3 million ‘jobs’ that are closed to non-EU migrants, while few are
accessing education or training. ½ of non-EU citizens are out of employment and training while
it is very common for immigrants to be in jobs below their qualifications or below the poverty
line.253

France does not have data available for the employment of the overall population. There
is an important negative correlation between the employment of the non-EU labor force and
MIPEXL. This finding is not surprising since the French labor market integration policies have
consistently been ineffective in helping the migrant labor force integrate into the labor market.
Additionally, there is a significant negative correlation between the low-skilled overall labor
force and MIPEXL policies. This could be due to the fact that MIPEXL policies are one of the
worst in the EU, but other factors could affect the decline in the employment of the labor force.
This could be a structural change in the overall labour market, where less low-skilled workforce
is needed. The financial crisis of 2008 could have also played a role in the decreasing
employment. As we can see from the graphs above both non-EU and low-skilled employment
started falling in 2008 reflecting the overall bad economic situation across Europe and in France.
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3.3.3 Germany DE
Similar to Austria, Germany has a long history of immigration, yet for most of history it
refused to accept its status as a migration country. Germany was also part of the Gastarbeiter
program in the 1960s 254 , but it did not accept that many of the temporary workers stayed
permanently in Germany constituting its first large foreign population. Since then, Germany has
been accepting a growing number of immigrants and asylum seekers. However, only in 2005, did
Germany
“develop(ed) integration policies as well as a welcoming culture for immigrants and foster(ed)
diversity systematically”. 255 Germany is one of the few countries with improving attitudes
towards immigrants. 83% think that Germany is a welcoming country and 72% believe that
German and non-EU citizens should have equal rights.256
In 2007, Germany followed a series of reforms in its policies to comply with EU
directives.257 In addition to these reforms, Chancellor Merkel announced the introduction of a
National Integration Plan258 and approved a 750 million worth of funding for integration. The
policy promoted open dialogue on integration, the strengthening of migrant organizations, and
better education and job opportunities for immigrants and those with a migrant background. For
the period of 2007–2014, Germany is ranking 1st out of 17 EU-countries as an immigrant
destination and 4th out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration policies.
Germany makes slow but steady progress on providing both equal access and great
support to immigrants. Germany has taken the lead in Europe to facilitate and support the

254

Kraler & Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” Migration Policy Institute, 2003, p.100.
Bendel, “Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and Local Levels”
Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014, 1.
256
Huddleston et.al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015.
257
Leise, “Germany Strives to Integrate Immigrants with New Policies,” Migration Policy Institute, 2007.
258
Nationaler Integrationsplan: Erster Fortschrittsbericht, 2008, 9-13.
255

83
recognition of foreign qualifications and skills, with its 2012 Recognition Act. Also, it is one of a
few EU counties that has a wider range of targeted support. Overall, Germany takes time to build
consensus; it pilots and then evaluates its new policies leading to effective outcomes. 259
Importantly, Germany has had the right political, economic, and social conditions to do so.
Germany’s integration policies have benefited and arguably contributed to its rising employment
rates (see graphs above) and positive attitudes towards immigrants.

We can see from the graphs above that MIPEXL policies have a strong positive
correlation with the employment of the total labor force. This result is in alignment with the ideal
results from labor market integration policies positively affecting the employment of the total
labor force. As I have analyzed above, Germany’s steps towards a successful labor market
integration policy has been very effective playing a key role in the rising employment rates. We
can also see that there is a positive correlation between non-EU labor force and MIPELX. Equal
access to employment, great general and targeted support, and the recognition of migrants’ skills
and qualifications are the factors that could have affected this strong positive correlation.
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3.3.4 Netherlands NL
The Netherlands has been a country with a great history of migration, with 11.5% of its
population being born abroad most from medium-to-low developed non-EU countries. 260 The
Netherlands created its first integration policy in the 1980s being a great advocate of
multicultural integration policies. However, since then its approach has drastically changed. In
2004, the Netherlands rejected multiculturalism261. Since 2004, civic integration and the creation
of a Dutch identity, which meant adherence with societal and cultural norms, have become the
basis for immigrant integration. After the collapse of 2010 right-wing government there has been
increasing support for the far-right, which is associated with negative immigrant rhetoric.
The far-right has continuously politicized the integration policy, pressuring the
government for restrictions. For the period of 2007–2014, the Netherlands is ranking 9th out of
17 EU-countries as an immigrant destination and 3rd out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market
immigrant integration policies. However, from 2010-2014, the Netherlands abandoned its
commitment to equal opportunities for immigrants dropping -8 points on MIPEX,262 more than
any other country has from 2007-2014. The Netherlands is taking a new approach to integration,
which could be called a “policy to no policy” increasingly disinvesting in integration policies. 263
Overall, immigrants are expected to integrate, but there is no obligation to the institutions and
integration policy makers to help in the process. This new approach has negatively affected the
labor market.
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Immigrant adults are demanded but not supported to learn the Dutch language and its
core civic values. 264 They are expected to cover the expenses for themselves with ‘loans’
replacing the grants and free courses once provided. Immigrants are also expected to be
employed, healthy, and civically active without the targeted support to overcome specific
barriers they face.265 Without the targeted support, non-EU employment rates are increasingly
falling. From 2010-2014, the Netherlands went from having one of the strongest targeted support
to one of the weakest in Western Europe. 266 Its targeted support score fell dramatically from
80/100 in 2007 to 20/100 in 2014.

We can see from the graphs above that MIPEXL policies have a strong positive
correlation with the employment of the total labor force. However, the positive correlation is
caused as both employment and MIPEXL values are falling. As extensively analyzed, the
Netherlands is increasingly disinvesting in immigrant integration and labor market migrant
integration specifically. Its MIPEXL score dropped from 91 in 2010 to 73 in 2014. Interestingly,
the NL total employment started falling before MIPEXL so disinvesting in immigrant integration
policies could reflect Netherlands’ perception that with decreased overall employment,
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immigrants are not welcomed. Disinvesting in MIPEXL could be used as a tool to incentive
migrants to migrate elsewhere if they cannot be successfully employed.
We can also see that there is a positive correlation between non-EU employment and
MIPEXL. This positive correlation could be explained by Netherlands’ absent targeted support
not helping immigrants in the integration process. Interestingly, the correlation is smaller in
comparison to total employment. This could be due to immigrants’ determination to integrate
regardless of the support they are getting by institutions.

3.3.5 Sweden SE
Sweden has been an immigration country since the 1950s with more than 15 percent267 of
the population being foreign-born; of those approximately 13 percent are non-EU migrants268.
The overall employment rate was very slightly affected by the economic crisis and is around 80
percent; one of the highest employment rates in the developed world. The Swedish population
has one of the most positive attitudes towards immigrants, similar to other Nordic countries, with
80% of the population supporting that immigrants and natives should have equal rights 269. In
2009270, Sweden passed the Introduction Act and the Discrimination Act aiming to reach all
those in need. For the period of 2007–2014, Sweden is ranking 10th out of 17 EU-countries as an
immigrant destination and 1st out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration
policies.
With the 2009 Labour Market Introduction Act, Sweden set new high standards for
labour market integration aiming to strictly scrutinize any obstacles in laws or policies, offering
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targeted support and mainstreaming its services to access a wider population in need. The Act
aims to make it easier for newcomers to learn the Swedish language, find or create a job
matching their skills. However, Sweden still needs to expand its access to procedures in order to
recognize migrants’ skills and foreign qualifications and offer more Swedish language
courses.271
According to Labour Force Surveys272, Sweden has the largest difference in employment
rate between the Swedish born and foreign-born population in 18 out of 26 countries that the ad
hoc-module was done in 2014. We can see from the graphs below that on average 50 percent of
the non-EU labor force is employed compared to an average of 80 percent of the Swedish born.
This is a very striking difference.

Overall, MIPEXL policies have a small negative correlation with the overall employment
of the population in Sweden. Looking at the employment of non-EU workers this negative
correlation sharply increases. We can see from the graphs that the score of MIPEXL policies
increased in 2009, following the 2009 Labour Market Introduction Act that was implemented.
However, the employment started falling in 2008, which was when the economic crisis hit. Thus,
the fall of the employment rate could be caused by the economic crisis. However, even if the
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initial fall was caused by the economic crisis, we would expect that the labour market integration
policies would positively affect non-EU employment leading to an increase in the non-EU
employment rate. The employment rate of the non-EU labor force started increasing, only
slightly, in 2011. Nevertheless, the employment rate between the Swedish nationals and TCNs is
still striking. We could argue that even if Sweden has a lot of policies in place they might be too
new, small-scale or general to affect outcomes at the national level.

3.3.6 United Kingdom UK
The United Kingdom has been an immigration country since the 1950s with around 10
percent273 of the population being foreign-born; of those approximately 13 percent are non-EU
migrants274. The UK along with the Netherlands were the countries that were perceived as the
prototypes of the “multiculturalist” integration approach275. In 1948, with the independence of
several of its colonies, the UK decided to grant all of its citizens in the Commonwealth countries
the right to work, settle and vote (Nationality Act).276 Many immigrants from the territories of
the former empire – Africa, Caribbean, Asia, and India – migrated to the UK and were perceived
with a wave of racism. The UK responded with the Race Relations Act, which could be seen as
its first migrant integration policy. UK’s immigration integration approach taken at this time
could be exemplified by Roy Jenkins, the then Home Secretary; “I … define integration not like
the levelling process of assimilation but as equal opportunities, associated with cultural diversity,
in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (1967).277

Eurostat, “Immigrants”, 2016.
Eurostat, “Distribution of immigrants by citizenship”, 2016.
275 Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007, p.8.
276Choquet, “Models of Integration in Europe” Fondation Robert Schuman, 2017.
277 Ibid.
273
274

89
However, starting in the 2000s a more secular approach was followed.278 The Nationality,
Immigration, and Asylum Act of 2002 put forward the symbolic strengthening of national
identity. After the Act, people seeking nationality had to take a citizens’ test claiming their
knowledge of the English language, the institutions, the history, and law of Britain. A decade
later, the UK started to sharply disinvest in immigrant integration policies. For the period of
2007–2014, the UK is ranking 2nd out of 17 EU-countries as an immigrant destination and 11th
out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration policies.
UK’s integration policies dropped 6 points, the 2nd largest drop following the
Netherlands. Specifically, for the labour market integration policies, the UK is further
eliminating its weak targeted measures for labour market integration at a time when most EUcountries in Northern Europe are increasing their support. Regardless from its 2010 Equality Act,
UK’s commitment to equality has decreased with 55% budget cuts for the Equality and Human
Rights Commission and an end to the mandatory equality impact assessments. 279 Overall, these
restrictions could be seen as being part of the government’s plan to reduce migration and pursue
a more nationalist approach.
The UK has good access to jobs, mainstream services and procedures to recognize
foreign qualifications and skills but expects immigrants to pursue jobs and training without
targeted support. Non-EU citizens in the UK are more likely than elsewhere in Europe to take up
education and training.280 However, in the UK, unemployed non-EU citizens are much less likely
to receive unemployment benefits to help them find a job 281 . A big number of non-EU
individuals are working in jobs at the level of their qualifications. Thus, in the UK there is not a
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big skill-job mismatch. Importantly, the UK’s labour market leaves behind a large number of
low-educated UK and non-EU born.
UK’s labour market clearly reflects the strengths and weaknesses of its current context.
The UK increasingly attracts global talent in competition with other English-speaking countries.
These employment outcomes are influenced by the flexible & growing number of the labour
force that is created with many coming to work and study in the UK and others coming with
university degrees and English skills.

For the overall labour force, MIPEXL policies are negatively correlated with the total
employment. This means that even if the UK has been disinvesting in the MIPEXL policies thus
the MIPEXL score is falling, total employment has been increasing regardless. This could be due
to the fact that UK’s labor market has been steadily increasing. At the same time, MIPEXL
policies and the non-EU labour force are positively correlated. Thus, with less migrant
integration efforts, the employment of the non-EU labour force has been falling. This could be
caused as the lack of general and targeted policies negative affects the non-EU labor force.
Interestingly, this could be the aim of the UK. With less immigrants being in employment it
could be an incentive for them to leave the UK and migrate elsewhere.
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3.4 Conclusion
As already stated, there has been limited economic research examining how the
integration of migrants will specifically affect the wages and employment of native workers. In
this econometric section, I attempted to look at the effect of labor market integration policies on
the employment of the total, non-EU, low-skilled, young, old and female labour force in
seventeen EU-countries. From my panel data analysis, I found that labor market immigrant
integration policies positively affect the employment of the total population. A result I was
expecting to find since I am arguing that the successful integration of migrants will
complementary respond to the labour market increasing the overall output and thus better the
employment of the total labour force.
In the random-effects-model regression analysis, MIPEXL is a determinant with
statistical significance for the total employment of the seventeen EU-country labor force causing
on average an 8.72% positive change. Disaggregating the total employment in different groups,
MIPEXL positively affects all the disaggregations of employment. However, for the non-EU,
low, and young labor force the effects of the MIPEXL policies are not statistically significant.
Looking at the correlation coefficients of the 17 EU-countries and specifically analyzing the
correlation coefficients of Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK Ι get
very mixed results.
An overall conclusion is that the EU does not have a comprehensive integration strategy
and nor do a lot of the EU countries. Traditional migration countries and most Western European
countries are increasingly investing in more effective general and targeted support programs.
Since 2008, Germany has taken important steps towards targeted programs and it was also the
first country, in 2012, to facilitate and support the recognition of foreign qualifications and skills.
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Recognizing qualifications acquired abroad, along with targeted support measures, is really
important to promote immigrant integration in the labour market and make full use of
immigrants’ skills. Nevertheless, countries like the Netherlands and the UK who had been
pioneers in the immigrant integration policies are increasingly disinvesting in their immigrant
integration policies. Thus, there is not a clear direction of the EU immigrant integration strategy
as a whole or the labour market immigrant integration policy specifically, which could be a very
important determinant of our mixed results. From my analysis, immigrant integration policies
seem to positively affect the employment of the total population and I would expect the impact to
be even more positive, if immigrant integration policies were more cohesive.
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Concluding Remarks
Immigration has been a heated topic with equally loud and influential proponents and
critics. There has been an extensive academic literature around the effects of migration on the
labour market. At the same time, there have been political debates about whether to allow
immigration and how many immigrants states should accept. More recently, there have been
increasing political debates about what to do with the immigrants already within states. Europe
has increasingly been challenged to integrate not only EU-nationals but also third-country
nationals; a reality that has modified the initial understanding of what integration meant. The
European Union has been aiming towards a collective response to migration and immigrant
integration with respect to immigrants’ rights. However, member states still perceive migration
and immigrant integration policies to be at the heart of national sovereignty.
Member states have been enacting different policies and laws not necessarily following
EU’s aim towards a collective EU response to migration and immigrant integration.
Nevertheless, labour market immigrant integration has been at the center of immigrant
integration policies. Positively, traditional migration countries and most Western European
countries are increasingly investing in more effective immigrant integration policies.
Nevertheless, countries like the Netherlands and the UK who had been pioneers in the immigrant
integration policies are increasingly disinvesting in their immigrant integration policies. These
different approaches are linked to the academic debates around the merits of multiculturalism or
assimilation.
Outside of initial reports commissioned by the European Union, there has been limited
quantitative analysis on the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies and more specifically
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on the effectiveness of labour market immigrant integration policies. Even fewer intellectuals,
have sought to compare these hypotheses against qualitative case studies. This has been the goal
of this Senior Project.
I examined the effect of labour market immigrant integration policies, as defined by the
Migrant Integration Policy Index, on the total employment rate and on the employment rate of
different subgroups for seventeen EU countries. Then I took a deeper look at the relationship
between employment and labor market immigrant integration for six different countries –
Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK –; countries that have been at the center of
the immigrant integration debate.
From my analysis, immigrant integration policies seem to positively affect the
employment of the total population and I would expect the impact to be even more positive, if
immigrant integration policies were more cohesive. The results of my analysis showed the need
to measure outcomes separately from policy as well as the need for more nuanced literature on
the subject. Most importantly, the analysis showed the importance of targeted support measures
and the recognition of qualifications acquired abroad as central factors to promote immigrant
integration in the labour market and make full use of immigrants’ skills.
The individual country analysis allowed us to further explore these conclusions:
Germany and Austria were countries with no immigrant integration policies before.
However, they have created immigrant integration policies and have increasingly invested in
targeted support programs, which have resulted in positive labour market outcomes. France, a
prototype of assimilationist integration policies, where the integration of immigrants has been
one of the worst in the EU, has negative results in the labour market. Sweden is a very
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interesting case, where its integration policies are the best of all in the EU, but this does not
translate in positive labour market outcomes. 50 percent of the non-EU labor force are not
employed compared to an average of 80 percent of the Swedish born. Sweden is a country that
stresses the need to examine results separately from policy, as policies in place are not enough to
lead to positive results. Finally, Netherlands and the UK, countries perceived as prototypes of the
“multiculturalist” integration approach, have increasingly been disinvesting in their integration
policies reflected in negative labour market outcomes. This could be linked to a negative
sentiment towards immigrants, where countries are trying to incentivize immigrants to move
elsewhere making it harder for them to be incorporated in the labour market. Overall, labour
market immigrant integration policies do seem to have a positive impact on the labor market.
However, the connection between policies and outcomes is not that straightforward thus a closer
look at individual country cases is of outmost importance.
Further Questions
There are many questions around immigrant integration yet to be answered and issues
that must be addressed. One critical issue is the limited data available across all EU counties.
This could be seen as even Eurostat is missing employment data for some EU countries and
MIPEX lacks integration data for all the countries in the EU. Additionally, there is not a
subgroup for the employment rate of the EU population for each EU country making it not
possible to quantify the impact of labour market immigrant integration policies on the native
population of each EU country. Better statistics could pave the way for more and better
indicators but also for more accurate outcome indices.
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The most natural extension of this Senior Project would be the inclusion of additional and
more accurate indicators for additional years. Including more and better-kept indicators and
statistics would give us a clearer picture of what immigrant integration entails and its impact
across the EU. Additionally, the incorporation of more years could show which countries are
consistently stronger in immigrant integration policies and how their rankings have changed
along with policy changes. Last but not least, it could lead to a better ability to indicate the
impact of economic recessions on immigrant integration.
The results call for our attention to the importance of institutions on immigrant
integration. Both my qualitative and quantitative analysis suggest that there is a positive
connection between institutions and immigrant integration. However, the immigrant integration
literature around this issue is limited. Thus, further studies could examine immigrant integration
through a historic institutional perspective.
Last but not least, this Senior Project brings into question the relationship between
policies and outcomes. As observed in the quantitative analysis, there is a discrepancy between
the employment rate and the immigrant integration policies. Namely, based on my regression
analysis, immigrant integration policies have a considerable positive impact on the total, old, and
female employment rate, but do not have the same significance for the non-EU, low-skilled, and
young labor force subgroups. Looking at specific EU countries my results are also mixed. These
results were not well explained by the stated hypothesis that immigrant integration policies will
lead to positive labour market outcomes as measured by the employment rate. This leads to a
very important question: Do immigrant integration policies actually have a significant impact on
immigrant integration outcomes?
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